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FINANCIAL  SECTOR  DEVELOPMENT  IN JAPAN
Dimitri  Vittas  and  Akihiko  KawauraL  INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to offer a consistent and comprehensive  analysis of some salient
features of Japanese financial practice in the postwar reconstruction and high growth era.  These are
features that appear to have contributed  to the phenomenal  success  of the Japanese economy in the thirty
years after the end of World War II.  Most of the observations made are well known to scholars and
observers of the evolution of the Japanese  financial system. However,  many of these features tend to be
misinterpreted, especially when they are discussed in isolation.  The paper emphasizes the role of the
govemrnment  in  creating a  macroeconomic and financial environment that  was conducive to  rapid
industrialization and economic growth.  This went beyond the maintenance  of price stability and also
covered the creation of a stable but segmented and tightly regulated financial system that favored the
financing of industry over other sectors of economic activity.
Although lending practice,  the direction of policy-based  finance and the structure of the financial
system changed over time, one of the constant features of the period under review was the existence of
a credible vision by the authorities that emphasized the development of internationally competitive
industries. There are some observers  who maintain that Japanese  government policies retarded economic
growth. However, it is difficult to believe  that high economic growth was achieved despite government
supportive  policies, let alone that growth  would have been even  higher  had government policies been more
neutral. At the same time, it is also difficult to believe that government  policies were the most important
factor behind the Japanese economic success. Indeed, one of the main elements of the Japanese vision
was the close cooperation of government agencies with the private sector and the reliance on privately
owned and managed corporations for the achievement of the industrial goals favored by government
policies.
The Japanese  financial system had during the period of reconstLuction  and high gnrwth a number
of features that, though not unique  to it, combined to give it a character that was quite distinct from that
of Anglo-American and continental  European financial systems. Suzuki (1980) long identified four such
characteristics:  the preponderant role of indirect finance; the "overloan"  position of large commercial
banks; the "overborrowing"  of industrial  companies;  and the artificially  low level of interest rates. Other
salient  features  included:  the  segmentation  and  fiagmentation  of  the  financial  system;  the
underdevelopment of securities markets and institutional investors;  the role played by the main bank
system; the close relations between banks and industry; the different roles played by debt and equity in
the Japanese  financial system;  the financial  intermediary role of large conglomerate  groups, especially  the
general trading companies, in channelling  fimds to small firms at the periphery of industrial groups; and
the role of policy-based finance institutions (Aoki 1988 and 1990,  Corbett 1987, Elston 1981, Horiuchi
1992, Horiuchi et al 1988, JDB/JERI 1993, Patrick 1984, Teranishi 1990, Vittas and Brown 1982).
These features evolved in a broad context of high saving  rates and large accumulation  of financial
assets,  mobilized mostly through deposit institutions,  including  the postal  savings system, and transformed
into short and long term and risky loans through commercial and long-term credit banks as well as
specialized  govenmnent  financial institutions. It is only since  the mid-1970s  that securities  markets started
Ito play an important role as sources of finance for public and private sector entities, while the impact of
institutional investors (insurance companies and pension funds) has an even more recent origin.
None of these features was unique to Japan.  Segmentation  and fragmentation of the financial
system characterized  many developing  countries and were also quite pronounced  in some developed ones,
such as the United States, Italy and Norway.  Indirect finance, "overloan" bank positions, and highly
leveraged corporate sectors were the norm in the vast majority of developing  countries as well as the less
advanced among the high income countries (e.g., the countries of Southern Europe).  Repressed interest
rates, directed credit programs and government development banks proliferated in the developing world.
Even high saving rates and mobilization  through postal savings occurred in many countries with
high growth rates and low inflation (the countries of Southem Europe as well as several North African
and Middle Eastern countries exhibited  these features).  The main bank system, the keiretsu groups and
the role of general trading companies  may be classified as unique to the experience of Japan (other Asian
countries that deve;oped similar institutions have clearly emulated the Japanese experience).  Yet, one
could argue that the system of house banks that had long prevailed in Germany had many features that
were similar to those found in Japan.  Perhaps what was unique about Japan was the combination of a
segmented and repressed financial system with macrostability  and export orientation, the existence  of the
main bank system and keiretsu groups, and active but "good"  government.
While the structure of the Japanese  economy  and Japanese  industry experienced  very rapid change
as the era of high growth unravelled, the structure of the Japanese financial system evolved at a much
slower pace.  Although there was considerable change, this mostly affected the size and types  of
operations of different parts of the financial system with relatively little effect on its overall structure.
Its evolution toward a more sophisticated,  integrated  and balanced  system was held back by the regulatory
policies applied by the Japanese authorities.  In  particular, there was little attempt to  remove the
fragrnentation  and segmentation of the financial system, even though these were used as arguments for
the justification of the use of policy-based  finance in postwar Japan.
To some extent, the slow pace of financial deregulation may be explained  by the greater emphasis
placed by the Japanese authorities on economic development through industrialization and the apparent
secondary importance attached to financial sector development.  It may also be related to the grater
control over the allocation of financial resources that a segmented and less sophisticated  financial system
conferred on the authorities.  In addition, the lack of confidence that a more advanced financial sector
could promote industriaiization  and economic development may also have played a part in shaping the
Japanese approach to financial sector development.
The perfonnance of countries  with more liberal financial systems, such as the United States and
the United Kingdom, did not at the time provide adequate reassurance  that more sophisticated  financial
systems  could make a better contribution  to industrialization  and thus accelerate economic development
Indeed, tie experience of Japan, the United States,  the United Kingdom and Scandinavian  countries  in the
1980s  (a period of extensive financial liberalization)  suggests  that the caution and concern of the Japanese
authorities in liberalizing the financial system during the high growth era may have been fully justified.
2The experience  and perfiormance  of the socioeconomic  system of Japan gives rise to two important
questions.  First, to what extent can the remarkable  performance of the Japanese economy during the
reconstruction  and high growth era be attributed to its particular policies with regard to industrialization
and economic development. The second question  is whether the Japanese  approach is inherently superior
to that of other advanced  countries in a way that would allow Japan to overtake and pull away from other
advanced countries in the years to come.
The evidence for an affirmative answer to the first question is very strong, even though many
economists argue that the main factors behind the success  of Japan were hard work, good management,
and high saving and investment. Many economists  have also pointed to the access enjoyed by Japanese
exports to the more open markets of the United States and Western Europe during a period of declining
trade barriers.
Putting aside hard work and good management,  the problem with these explanations  is that some
of the underlined attributes  also characterized  other countries with more modest records of achievement.
Thus, they appear to disregard the fact that most developing and developed countries had access to the
more open markets promoted by trade liberalization. In addition, several countries achieved  high saving
and investment  rates in an environment  of macroeconomic  stability. Yet few developing  countries outside
East Asia showed the same persistently high rates of economic growth.
On the other hand, as already noted above, state intervention in credit allocation and mobilization
of stable financial resources through postal savings were not unique features of the Japanese  experience.
Many developing countries had controlled and repressed financial systems, mobilized financial savings
through postal savings or other deposit banks, and used development banks for credit allocation. Yet the
performance of these other countries was not as persistently good as that of Japan and other East Asian
countries.
There can be no doubt that hard work and good management  are closely associated  with economic
success and economic growth.  But hard work is not a constant that some countries have and others do
not.  British workers were perceived as very hard working, reliable and productive  when British industry
and the British economy were doing well but were criticized for their self-centered and short-sighted
working practices during the long period of relative economic decline suffered by the British economy.
Thus, hard work and good working practices  may well be a symptom, as much as a cause, of economic
success.
Good management is probably more a cause than a  symptom of  economic success.  Good
management encompasses strong leadership in designing action plans with  clear objectives and  in
implementing  them effectively and flexibly. The  Japanese  private sector,  and especially  Japanese industry,
have received considerable  praise for their effective management  practices and their ability to implement
long-term strategies.  The success of development  policies in Japan could also be attributed to its good
management of government  policies. The Japanese  approach  entailed the development  of credible  visions,
the reliance on extensive consultation with the private sector,  the fonnulation of well focused programs,
and the use of effective monitoring and other means of execution of these programs. Although they are
3difficult to quantify, it is these features that appear to have made a distinct contribution to the economic
success of Japan.
The second questioIn  is morc difficult to answer.  Claims about the alleged superiority of the
Japanese system and its ability to overtake and pull away from other advanccd economies appear to be
based on somewhat  uncritical projections  of economic  trends over the 1970s and 1980s  when the Japanese
economy was able to sustain a high rate of growth and industrial success, including a remarkable export
performance  despite an unrelentingly  rising exchange  rate. In the first place, these projections  disregarded
the fact that, although Japan may have overtaken several European countries, it was still lagging beh?nd
the United States and a few European countries in per capita income levels expressed in purchasing power
parities.  They also disregarded  the significant long-term costs of the Japanese  approach, in terns  of the
low quality of housing and other urban infrastructure relative to the level of per capita income of the
country, or the large costs of industrial restructuring. Furthermore, they did not allow for the changing
nature of the Japanese system, where both trade and financial liberalization weakened the ability of the
authorities to exert control over market developments  and also lessened the importance of most of the
features that have characterized  the Japanese  system during the high growth era.
The excesses of the 1980s and the current economic recession facing Japan undermine claims
about its ability to continuously  outperform other countries. The coincidence of these problems with the
underlying changes in the structure and orientation of Japanese industrial and financial policy raise the
possibility that they may be partly explained by the abandonment  of the traditional approach and by
coordination failures during the difficult transition to a less regulated and directed system.  Still, it is
doubtful that the traditional approach could have been sustained  in the face of the growing  complexity and
sophistication  of both industry and finance and the rising importance  of individual  industrial and financial
groups with strong vested interests.
Although it may no  longer be  sustainable, the traditional Japanese approach played a  very
significant part in promoting industrialization  and accelerating  economic  growth during the reconstruction
and high growth era.  The recent experience of other East Asian countries suggests that the Japanese
approach can be replicated in other countries, provided  certain precor,  ditions are met and provided certain
lessons from the failures of industrial and credit policies in other developing countries are heeded.
It is important  to emphasize  that the same preconditions  that are required for successful industrial
and credit policies, e.g. well functioning bureaucracies,  effective  monitoring, and financial  discipline, are
also required for successful  market-based  policies. In particular,  there is now widespread  agreement that
macroeconomic stability, good infornation  systems, effective monitoring, and financial discipline are
essential for the smooth functioning of efficient financial  systems. The question for developing  countries
is whether there is scope for state intervention in the organization  of the financial system and the use of
well designed and  narrowly focused directed credit programs in the transition from inefficient and
malfunctioning financial systems to modem and efficient ones.
This paper addresses  the first of the two questions raised above.  Unlike the second question,
which is based on debatable,  and often uncritical, projections  of past trends, there is strong evidence about
4the relevance of the first question. Several studies have  recently addressed  this same issue.  In addition
to thc World Bank study of the East Asian Miracle (World Bank 1993), the Economic Development
Institute has conducted a dctailed study of the main bank system, while senior officials of the Japan
Dcvelopmcnt  Bank and Japan Economic Research Institute have compicted a comprehensive study of
policy-based finance in postwar Japan (JDB/JERI 1994). This paper, which is part of the World Bank
research project on the Effectiveness  of Credit Policies in East Asia, focuses on the links between policy-
based finance and the evolution of the Japanese financial system.  It draws extensively on these three
studies but more especially on the JDB/JERI  study.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The next section sets out the evolution
of the Japanese financial system.  Section III reviews some important aspects of policy-based finance,
while the following section discusses  the importance  of credible visions for the success of policy-based
finance.  The last section summarizes the paper and offers some conclusions  on the relevance of the
Japanese  experience for developing countries.
5II.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Although the pace of change of the financial system was much slower than that of industry, the
system was far from static.  Both the Japancsc financial system and policy-based finanic cxperienced
considerable  change over time.  Discussion  of the importance  of various featurcs of the system needs to
take full account of the fact that the object of analysis was a moving target.  This was as true of the
impact of regulatory restrictions as of morc basic featurcs, such as the importance of the main bank
system.
In the discussion that follows, attention is focused on: the size of the financial system; its
segmentation  and fragmentation;  the role of the main bank system and the keiretsu groups; the "overloan"
position of large commercial banks; the impact of branching and merger controls; the role of other
financial institutions (such as the postal  savings  system and Trust Fund Bureau,  the long-term credit banks
and governnient financial institutions, and institutional investors and securities markets); the issue of
repressed interest rates and compensating  balances;  the overborrowing  and high leverage of the corporate
sector; the role of general trading companies;  and the restrictions on housing loans, consumer credit and
real estate development finance.  The operation of policy-based finance and its  interaction with the
evolution of the financial system are discussed in the following section.
Size. Although the underdevelopment  of the Japanese  financial  system was used as a justification
for the reliance on indirect finance and the opemtion of directed credit policies, this underdevelopment
referred to the qualitative structure of the system, and especially the limited part played by securities
markets  and long-term institutional  investors,  rather than  to its quantitative  aspects. The Japanese  financial
system, benefitting from a high rate of household saving and a strong liquidity  preference,  was very large,
in relation to GNP, even before World War 11. In the postwar period, households continued to save at
very high rates. As investment in housing was constrained by the limited availability  of household credit
facilities and the high price of new housing, this translated into a vast accumulation  of financial assets.
Between the end of World War II and 1988, the financial sector of Japan expanded at an average
annual rate of 21% in terms of deposits, savings, certificates of deposits (CDs) and bank debentures
(Table 1). Although the sector's annual growth rate declined  steadily from 46% in the late 1940s  to 26%
in the 1950s, 19% in the 1960s, 17% in the 1970s  and 10% in the 1980s,  it always outpaced the expansion
of gross national product (GNP).  The increase in its ratio to GNP confirms the tempo of its expansion.
In the 1960 fiscal year, the ratio to GNP was already 113%. This rose to 143% in 1970, 203% in 1980
and 289% in 1988 (Table 2).
Since interest rates on household  deposits were generally  low, this vast growth in financial savings
must be attributed to the high rate of saving, itself mainly caused by high economic growth and low
fertility rates, and to the public's trust in the stability and safety of banks. Following the banking crisis
of the 1920s,  the authorities  ensured that no bank would be allowed  to fail and no depositor  would suffer
losses. Weak banks were almost invariably  merged with stronger ones as a means of imparting greater
public confidence in the safety of bank deposits.
6Fragmcntntion  and Segmentation.  The Japanese  financial syslem is not as fragmentod as, say,
the US system.  Thcre is a total of nearly 7,000 financial  .stitutions,  or about 50 pcr million people, as
against  a total of well over 40,000 institutions, and over 150  per million inhabitants,  in the United States.
Moreover, almost  6,000 of the Japanese  financial institutions arm  vcry small agricultural and fisheries
credit  cooperatives withi a small aggregatc share of  household deposits.  There arc lcss than  150
commercial banks against well ovcr 10,000 in the United States. Other advanced countrics, such as Italy
and Norway, have also suffered from greatcr fTagmentation  than Japan, although most European countrics
havc far more concentrated financial systems, especially if savings banks and credit cooperatives in
Gernany, the Netherlands  and France,  which are linked  through regional and national central institutions,
are treated as singic entities.
Unlike fragmentation,  segmentation  in the financial  system was quite extensive, in both functional
and geographic terms.  There was the long-standing legal separation of commercial anl  investment
banking, which was imposed by the occupation authorities after the war and has been very slow to
remove.  Commercial banks were restricted to raising short-term deposits and making short-term loans,
with  the  longer maturities reserved for  the  long-term credit  banks and  the government financial
institutions.  In addition, the business of trust banking  was limited to a few institutions.
Among commercial banks, the large city banks tended to focus on the larger customers and
members of the keiretsu conglomerate groups, although over the past dozen years or so, there has been
a shift of emphasis  toward smaller finns and households. During the reconstruction  and high growth era,
the orientation of city banks was clearly toward large corporations. Regional banks specialized  in dealing
with  middle market companies, while the old  sogo (or  mutual) banks and the credit  associations
concentrated on smaller firmns. There were also numerous finance companies that provided consumer
credit to individuals while housing loan companies  extended housing loans. Although city banks always
operated nationwide branch networks, the restrictions on branching and mergers prevented them from
encroaching effectively on the business of regional and sogo banks.
The Main Bank System and Keiretsu Groups. The main bank system and the keiretsu groups
are two of the most distinctive features of the Japanese  financial structure.  The two features are not
identical but they are clearly closely related. In postwar Japan it is possible to classify industrial groups
into three types: traditional groups; bank-centered  groups; and modern industrial groups.
The first type includes  those groups, such as Mitsubishi,  Mitsui and Sumitomo, that are the direct
descendants  of the prewar zaibatsu. These comprise  a large number of companies  that are linked together
by small, but widely spread,  cross shareholdings,  by interlocking  directorships,  and by preferential business
arrangements.  Group companies of modem zaibatsu are indebted to the group banks and other group
financial institutions and do business  with each other, often through the group general trading companies.
The second type are bank-centered groups, such as the Dai Ichi Kangyo, Sanwa and Fuji bank
groups.  Bank-centered  groups are substantially less cohesive than modem zaibatsu. Companies tend to
be indebted to the group bank but they are not associated  with each other and cross shareholdings  are less
7cxtensive.  There is also a greatcr  tendency for the larger  companies in the group to bc financially
independent and this may also  cxplain the comparalive loosencss  of bank-centered groups.
Thc third type are nomially forfned around a large mainufacturi'ig  compaly such as Toyota and
Matsushita.  Thcsc groups tcnd to be morc homogeneous  than the other two. bul the number of group
companies can be vcry largc with many specialized small comp,anics  acting as sub-contractors and
depending on the larger mcmbcrs of the group for their busincss  or credit.  Dcpcnding  on their financial
performance, the leading companies in thcsc groups may havc no bank debt.
The main bank system was more central to the functioning  of thc first two typcs of keirctsu and
less so for the third type that had a less  close affiliation with individual  city banks. As is argued  at lcngth
in various papers produced for the EDI project on this topic, the main bank system has some common
features with 'tue German Hausbank approach, but goes well beyond it in many respects (Aoki, Patrick
and Sheard 1994).  The main bank system is related to the preponderar"  of indirect finance in the
Japanese financial system, the use of loan syndications  and the practice of extended cross shareholdings
among member firTns  of particular Keiretsu conglomerate groups.  A main bank would normally be a
member of the same  group, the largest lender among  commercial  banks (a long-term credit bank or a trust
bank may be a larger lender), and one of the largest shareholders  among financial institutions. It would
take the lead in organizing loan syndications,  undertaking  project appraisals and lining up other lenders.
After approval, it would monitor the behavior and performance  of borrowing firms on behalf of other
meknbers  of the loan syndication.  In times of difficulty, it would work out a rescue plan, involving
rescheduling  of loans, reduction of interest payments,  changes  in share capital, restructuring  of operations,
and replacement  of management. It would explain the situation to other lenders,  trying to reach consensus
but would compensate  other lenders that might wish to withdraw their support.
The origin  of  the main  bank system can be  traced to  the  prewar  practice of  first  cross
shareholdings  and then loan syndications  as the prewar zaibatsu ran out of internally  generated funds for
financing their exparsion plans and  had to  resort to  external funding (Teranishi 1994).  This  was
reinforced by the designation  of manager banks for the financing of munitions companies  toward the end
of the war effort. After the war, despite the dissolution  of zaibatsu, prewar practices  re-emerged  with the
formation of keiretsu groups.
It is sometimes argued that the main bank system was not a deliberate creation of government
policy (Patrick 1994). This may be so but the system had the government's blessing and its emergence
was supported by government  measures, such as the permission  for banks to own up to 10% of the equity
of individual  companies in the early 1  950s when  Japanese  officials and industrialists  were keen to prevent
foreign companies from acquiring large stakes in Japanese  companies. As is argued below,  the main bank
system and the close relationships  between banks and industry that it entailed were part of the vision of
the authorities regarding the role of the financial system in promoting industrialization  and growth.
The essence of the main bank system was not only the buildup of close relationships and
consultation  between banks and industry, but also the economies  of scale in delegating  monitoring to one
bank and avoiding  the free riding problems  that could  arise when financial institutions  had small exposures
8and smnall  stakes in the success  of individual  industrial and  commercial  companies. It is claimed that the
main  bank syslon;  lowered  the agency  cosis  of extenal finance and lhe costs  of rescuing and restructurng
firms in distress  (Shenrd 1994). It is not, howover,  clear that Japanese  banks  dovoloped  boteor  capLbbilitios
in monitoring firms.  As is argued  by Corbet (1987). the methods  of crodit apprmisal  and lending critoria,
including thlc rliance on collateral security, used by Japanese  bnnks were if anything  less  sophisticated
than those used by Amcrican or British banks.
Rather  the main bank system was part of the closeness of relations in a keirctsu group, which
involved  regular mectings and exchange  of infonnation at different levels in the hicrarchy of management,
reaching  up to the mectings of presidents of first line ,.oup  companies. The main clements  were the
discussion of group plans, the formulation of group policy and the sense of mutual commitment that
industrial companics could rcly on the support of their main banks, while the main banks would be
compcnsated  with additional fcc based  business  for arranging loan syndical  ions  and being ready  to provide
support in times of difficulty.
Group discussion  and monitoring  provided  a useful check against  overexpansion  as well as against
overdiversification  of individual  companies, especially into unrelated  activities. The main bank system,
and more broadly the kciretsu groups, provided an  effective mechanism for coping with  long-term
uncertainty, for encouraging  specialization,  and for preventing managerial indulgence in overexpansion
and  overdiversification. The big losses  suffered by corporate conglomerates  in the United States and the
United  Kingdom were generally absent in Japan (at least until the 1980s).
However,  the main bank system also entailed significant costs.  It implied a structure of rigid
relationships (the convoy concept). These could change but with difficulty as most financial institutions
were reluctant to  suffer a decline in their relative position in group syndications.  It restricted the
managerial  independence of industrial companies, which became a bigger handicap as operations and
attendant problems  became  more complex. And, with a growing  disparity in perfornance among different
industrial sectors and among different individual  companies  within industrial  sectors, it increased  the extent
of cross-subsidization  among group companies and the exposure of banks to problem loans in poorly
perfonning companies. It is perhaps the existence  of these costs, which increased  over time, that explain
the  vast recourse by Japanese industrial companies to the eurocurrency and eurobond markets during the
1980s. The availability of cheaper fuids both in terms of lower coupon payments and in terms of fewer
managerial restraints weakened the close ties of keiretsu groups and diminished the part played by the
main bank system in industrial finance during this period.
The "Overloan"  Position of City Banks.  For most of the high growth era  the large city banks
benefitted from the regulation of deposit interest rates but were prevented fiom collecting too many
deposits by branching and merger restrictions that protected the position of regional and mutual banks.
Instead,  city banks relied on financing from the Bank of Japan for complementing  their deposit funds and
meeting the large demand for loanable funds by the large industrial companies that were their main
customers.  For most of this period, city banks operated with what is known as an "overloan"  position.
The "overloan"  position amounted to as much 10% of the total credits granted by the city banks at the
height of their dependence on cental bank funds.
9The "overloan" feature was not unique to the Japanese financial system.  As already noted,
commercial  banks in many developing  countries  also operated with "overloan"  positions and relied on their
central banks for funding their lending operations. But in most other developing countries, central bank
credit was linked to credit policies  that sought  to influence  the allocation of credit both to different sectors
and to individual companies.  An extreme example of central bank influence  was Francophone Africa
where indi- idual commercial  bank credits above a certain threshold  required  the prior authorization of the
central bank.  This extensive meddling in commercial bank lending decisions  was absent in Japan.
There is no evidence that the credit accommodation  of the Bank of Japan was extended with
conditions attached that the funds be channelled  to particular industries  or individual  companies. But the
existence of the "overloan" position clearly strengthened the moral suasion and administrative guidance
offered by the Bank of Japan with regard to lending policies.  In particular, the Bank of Japan had
considerable  leverage  in discouraging  city banks from lending  for speculative  purposes,  such as real estate
development,  or for lending to the household sector for housing finance or consumer  credit. It is perhaps
not surprising that Japanese  banks engaged in substantial  direct and indirect lending for housing and real
estate purposes in the 1980s when they were no longer dependent on Bank of Japan funds for financing
their loans and the moral suasion of the authorities  carried less weight.
Branching  and Merger Controls.  Japanese  commercial  and other banks  were subject  to rigorous
controls on mergers  and branch expansion. For most of the postwar period,  bank mergers were approved
mostly in response to financial difficulties, although the policy became more liberal in recent years.
Branching controls limited the ability of large banks to expand  their networks  and attract more household
deposits.  For most of the postwar period, city banks were confined to  small net increases in their
branches, although  approvals for relocating  branches  were more readily granted. The result of this policy
was that although city banks operated nationwide with branches  in all major cities, their branch networks
were very small by international  standards  with an average of 200 branches  per city bank.  In the 1970s,
this compared with over 3,000 branches for each large British bank, well over 2,000 for large French
commercial banks, and well over 1,000 branches for the large Gernan  commercial  banks. The biggest
city bank, the Dai Ichi Kangyo Bank, had 300 branches in the 1970s  (it was overtaken in the 1990s by
the Sakura Bank, which resulted from the merger of  Mitsui and Taiyo Kobe banks and had over 500
branches at the time of the merger).
Although  economists  have traditionally  questioned  the benefits  of large branch networks and have
argued that they represent an inefficient form of nonprice competition, banks around the world have
engaged in massive  branch expansions  when allowed  to do so. This was the experience in Germany after
the removal of branching  controls in 1958  when commercial  banks, savings  banks and credit coop- -tives
proceeded to double and even triple their branch networks witiin the spate of five years.  The same
pattern was repeated in France in the late 1960s,  in Spain in the mid-1970s  and in Italy in the late 1980s.
In the case of Italy, branch expansion  was more limited because of the advent of electronic banking and
plastic cards that allow remote banking  and thus reduce the importance  of branches in collecting deposits,
marketing loans and servicing customers. Even in the United States, elimination of branch restrictions
at different states was accompanied  by large branch expansions.
10The branching  controls  in Japan prevented  city banks from increasing  their market share in deposit
gathering and perpetuated the segmnentation  of the banking and deposit market.  It is sometimes argued
that branch licenses were used by the authorities as carrots and rewards for well behaving banks, while
license refusals were used as sticks for defiant banks. But the evidence provided for this is rather weak,
especially in view of the continuing rapid expansion of the network of post offices and the success of
postal savings in attracting household deposits.  Table 3 shows the increase in branch networks for the
largest city banks.  The larger than average increases  experienced  by some banks in the 1960s and by
Sumitomo in the 1980s  were the result of bank mergers,  often arranged by the authorities. Otherwise,  in
svw=ing branch licenses,  care seems to have been taken not to upset the prevailing ranking of banks.
Throughout the postwar  period, there were more post offices accepting  deposits than all the head-
offices and branches of city banks, regional banks, trust banks, long-term credit banks, sogo banks and
shinkin banks combined (Table 4). It was only in 1990 that bank branches finally outnumbered post
offices. The number of branches of city banks might have increased  more rapidly if there was no branch
regulation by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). In order to maintain the "order" of the banking sector,  the
MOF restricted the expansion  of city banks' branch networks  to protect the business  of regional, sogo and
shinkin banks'.  Between 1953 and 1990, those three types of "local" banks increased their branches  by
1100/e, 125% and 297% respectively. In contrast, city banks managed to expand only by 91% and this
despite playing a much bigger part as main banks for large industrial companies than the "local" banks.
Postal Savings and  Trust Fund Bureau. Established in 1875, the postal savings systern grew
exceptionally rapidly in the past 30 years or so. Arguably, it is the largest single financial institution in
the world with total  deposits in excess of  130 trillion yen (about 1.3 trillion US dollars), which is
approximately three times that of the world's largest bank.  The postal savings system benefitted from a
large nationwide branch network and from preferential tax and regulatory treatment.  Although interest
income on small deposits with all banks was exempt firom  income tax, postal savings benefitted from the
greater ability of depositors to hold more than one account in fictitious names in post offices than in
banks.  In addition, postal savings offered longer maturities of up to  10 years, while the banks were
initially limited  to up to 12 months until 1971  and have since extended  the maturity range of their deposits
to up to 3 years.
The Trust Fund Bureau is a mechanism  by which the government  (Ministry of Finance) manages
the savings and deposits obtained through various channels such as postal savings, postal life insurance
and welfare insurance.  The growth of postal savings and Trust Fund Bureau fumds  in relation to total
financial assets and GNP are shown in Table S.  The Trust Fund Bureau provides funds to the various
govenunent financial institutions,  while in the 1950s it also invested extensively  in the debentures  issued
by long-term credit banks. In this respect, it has been argued that the reliance of the Industrial Bank of
Japan on funding from the Trust Fund Bureau may explain its greater role in financing finns in priority
sectors during this period (Packer 1994).
1  Ueda (1994) notes that "even as of May 1993, city banks are not allowed to open more than one
branch every two years", although  the authorities  recently announced  that all branching restrictions  would
be abolished.
11Long-Term  Credit Banks and Government  Financial Institutions.  The segmentation of the
Japanese  financial system was also reflected  in the role of long-term  credit banks and government  financial
institutions.  These institutions specialized in  providing long-term finance and generally played a
complementary role to  that of  commercial banks  during the reconstruction and  high  growth era.
Govemment financial institutions  were expressly prohibited from competing with banks and other private
financial institutions.  Their purpose was to provide finance for projects and borrowers who could not
obtain funds at satisfactory terms from commercial sources.  The loans and discounts and securities
holdings of government financial institutions relative to those of other financial institutions are shown in
Tables 6 and 7.  It can be seen that GFIs accounted for around 10% of total loans.
The main source of funds for the long-term credit banks, of which the Industrial Bank of Japan
was by far the largest and most important, was the issue of two types of debenture: one-year discount
debentures, bought mainly by individuals, and five-year coupon debentures, initially bought mainly by
financial institutions, but after the mid-1970s also bought mainly by individuals. Long-term credit banks
also accepted deposits from financial  institutions and fiom their own clients, but they were not pennitted
to take deposits from the general public.
The government financial institutions, of which the Housing Loan Corporation was the largest,
but the Japan Development  Bank and the Export-Import Bank of Japan the most important for providing
finance to  industrial companies, relied for their funds on allocations from the Trust Fund Bureau, the
government agency that channelled  postal  savings and other longer-term  resources. Government financial
institutions also included the Small Business Finance Corporation  for lending to small and medium-size
firms and the People's Finance Corporation  for lending  to very small and newly created firms. The loans
of different GFIs are shown in Table 8.
The complementarity  between long-term  credit institutions  and commercial  banks was manifested
in the division of appraisal and monitoring responsibilities. Long-term credit institutions analyzed  the
prospects of particular sectors, carried out project appraistils and compiled credit reports.  The sector
assessments prepared by the Industrial Bank of Japan -were  particularly inportant  during the first two
postwar decades. In contrast,  monitoring of the behavior and perfonnance  of borrowers after the granting
of particular credits was entrusted to commercial  banks. Unlike  the govemment financial institutions,  the
Industrial Bank of Japan also played an active part as a main bank for large companies that did not belong
to particular keiretsu groups, especially in the steel sector and other heavy industries. As such, [BJ took
the lead on numerous occasions in arranging mergers,  organizing workouts and generally rescuing fmns
in difficulty (Packer 1994).
Underdevelopment of Institutional Investors. During  the high growth era, institutional  investors
played a very limited part in the Japanese  financial system, although they have been growing rapidly in
more recent years.  The main reason for this was the absence of separately funded company pension
schemes.  Despite the relative underdevelopment of  social security, most companies either operated
unfunded schemes or maintained book reserves to meet their future pension obligations.  These were
favored by tax regulations and were invested internally in the business  of the sponsoring  company rather
than through the securities markets.
12Insurance companies were better established but were highly regulated and restricted in the
business they could undertake and the investments  they could make.  Trust banks, which specialized in
fund management  and trust business,  were more developed although half their business  consisted of loan
trusts, which involved the creation of trusts for lending to commercial  and industrial business. Since the
late 1970s,  institutional  investors,  especially  funded  company  pension schemes,  have experienced  immense
growth, following the change  in  regulatory orientation and  the  increasing emphasis on  financial
liberalization.
Limited Role of Securities Markets.  The securities markets also played a very limited role
during the reconstruction  and high growth era. The equity market enjoyed  rapid growth in the 1950s  and
early 1960s,  but a major setback suffered i.i the mid-1960s caused big losses to individual investors and
massive withdrawals of funds.  Raising new external equity by companies was discouraged by the
requirement to  price new shares at par ratner than market values, which raised the effective cost of
external equity.  Most equity  issues were rights issues allocated to  existing shareholders.  Cross-
shareholdings  among Keiretsu firms were encouraged,  while restrictions were imposed  on shareholdings
by foreign investors. The corporate bond market was also subject to tight restrictions  regarding collateral
security, issuing commissions,  coupon rates, size and other issue terms.
The securities markets started to expand after the mid-1970s, when the govemment resorted to
long-term bond finance in order to finance its large deficit in a noninflationary  form. A gradual process
of liberalization was then set in train as commercial  banks objected to having to hold to maturity large
quantities of govemment bonds.  The securities markets became a major source of fir.ance for  large
national and regional companies  during the 1980s  (Campbell  and Hamao 1994). Fund raising  through the
use of convertible bonds and bonds with equity warrants in domestic and international  markets allowed
Japanese companies to expand their productive capacities in the 1980s at very low funding costs.  But
such excessive fund raising also fuelled the speculative  bubble that characterized  the Japanese economy
in the second half of the 1980s. The collapse of share prices in 1990 and the expiration of warrants and
conversion  options exposed Japanese  companies  to big increases  in their funding costs  at a time when their
sale revenues and profits suffered substantial  falls as a result of the continuing  appreciation of the yen and
the economic recession in Europe and the United States.
Repressed  interest rates and compensating balances.  As noted above, Suzuki identified as one
of the characteristics  of the postwar financial system the artificially low level of interest rates, although
this view has been disputed by some economists 2. The issue of interest rates is obscured by the practice
of compensating  balances  on which little hard information  is available. It is also obscured  by a conceptual
debate regarding the suitability of different price indices for deflating nominal rates.
What is not disputed is that nominal interest rates on both deposits and loans were controlled  for
most of the postwar  period and especially  during the high growth era. It is also not disputed  that the level
of  effective  lending  rates  was  affected by  the  widespread practice  of  compensating balances.
2  For a review of alternative views held by Japanese and other commentators on this and other
related issues, see Vittas and Wag (1991).
13Compensating balances ranged from 11% for large corporations borrowing from city banks to over 40%o
for small firms borrowing from sogo banks and credit cooperatives  (Hamada and Horiuchi 1987).  It is
not clear whether compensating  balance requirements  were based on average or minimum balances and
whether they were placed in noninterest-bearing  demand deposits or interest-bearing savings or time
deposits.  Some analysts indicate that compensating  deposits were interest bearing and were based on
average balances. They also suggest that compensating  balances were to some extent held willingly by
corporations both because they provided liquidity against future credit controls and because they were
perceived as contributing to the cementing of closer and stronger relationships  with their banks (Suzuki
1980).
The impact of compensating  balances  on the effective nominal cost of loans depends on their size,
their nature (average or minimum) and their return.  If large corporations were required to maintain
balances equal to 10% of loans and if the loan rate was 7%, then the effective loan rate would rise to
7.78% if compensating  balances earned zero interest, to 7.44% if they earned 3% interest, and to only
7.22% if they earned 5% interest.  For smaller companies, where compensating  balances were reported
to reach as high as 40%, the effective loan rate would rise from 7% to  11.87% with zero interest on
compensating  deposits, to 9.67% with 3% interest, and to 8.33% with 5% interest.  Thus, the impact of
compensating  balances could range from a trivial few basis points to an escalation of interest costs by
nearly 500 basis points.
Apart from the dispute regarding the effective  nominal level of interest rates, another controversy
concerns their real level. Deflated by the consumer  price index (CPI), real interest rates, especially those
on household deposits,  were quite low (almost zero or slightly negative) in Japan during most of the high
growth era.  But deflated by the wholesale price index (WPI), they were positive and not lower than
similarly deflated interest rates in other OECD  countries (Horiuchi 1984). The difference  arises from the
higher productivity  gains of tradable goods that mostly make up the WPI compared to the services and
nontradables that are heavily represented in the CPI.
The difference between the WPI and the CPI was much larger in Japan du.ing the high growth
era than in other OECD countries.  Thus, one could argue that real interest rates were positive and not
lower than those of other OECD countries if they were deflated by the WPI, but they were low and mildly
repressed if deflated  by the CPI.  Given that the consumers  save in order to smooth their consumption  and
especially in order to be able to sustain their living standards during their retirenent,  it seems more
appropriate to use the CPI for deflating nominal intrst  rates.
A further aspect of the interest rate debate is that in a high growing economy like Japan real
interest rates, even if they were deflated by the WPI, should have been higher than those prevailing in
other more slowly growing OECD economies. Ueda (1994) argues that interest  rates, adjusted  for the cost
of compensating  balances, were below market clearing levels for most of the high growth era.
The overborv.inng  and high  leverage of the corporate  sector.  Another characteristic of
Japanese finance was the high level of borrowing and high leverage of Japanese industry.  Lending to
industry from all domestic sources was quite high throughout  the high growth era as industrial companies
14resorted to borrowing from private and government financial institutions  to finance their large investment
programs and  expansion of capacity and  production.  A comparison of  four countries showed that
outstanding loans to industry in Japan corresponded  to 1  18% of GDP in 1975 as against 44% in France,
43% in the United Kingdom and 41% in Germany (Viuas and Brown 1982).
Apart from the much greater demand for investment  funds, this high level of borrowing can be
attributed to  a  number of  more technical aspects of Japanese financial practice at the time.  First,
companies maintained large funds  on deposit  with Japanese  banks: these amounted  to 33% of GDP against
17% in Gennany, 9% in France and 8% in the United Kingdom (Vittas and Brown 1982).  Second,
Japanese  companies provided  trade credit to the household sector,  which in other countries was provided
directly by the banks.  This was partly the result of restrictions oni  granting consumer credit by banks.
Thirdly, Japanese banks lent at the time small amounts to overseas  residents and thus companies had to
borrow more from their banks to finance cxports to overseas  residents by comparison with American or
European  companies. Fourthly,  again at the time, Japanese  companies  had a smaller recourse  to financial
markets overseas, a practice that changed dramatically in the 1980s.  In contrast, large American and
European  corporations  frequently  raised funds in the eurocurrency  markets. Fifthly, Japanese  corporations
used to provide housing accommodation  to their workforce, which inflated their demand for credit.
The argument that Japanese  companies  operated  with high leverage  was based on reported figures
which showed an equity ratio of around 15% during the high growth era. This compared with well over
40% for UK companies and over 60% for US companies. But reported leverage  levels  were (and still are)
heavily distorted  by differences  in accounting  conventions. Three main conventions  led to under-reporting
of equity ratios in the accounts of Japanese companies during the high growth era (Vittas and Brown
1982).  First, companies enjoyed a  number of tax free reserves (for bad debts, bonus payments to
employees, pension obligations, depreciation of fixed assets, export performance,  etc.) that appeared on
their balance sheets as long-term liabilities  and inflated their reported indebtedness. In the UK and the
US, such items would either be held in separate trusts (e.g. funding for pensions) or would be deducted
from the gross value of assets  (e.g. depreciation reserves  for fixed assets).  Second, larger companies  had
unusually  high levels of trade receivables  and accounts payable. Both of these factors had the effect of
swelling the liabilities of companies on the balance sheet. Third, fixed assets (especially land) failed to
be adequately revalued over time.  As a result, the true equity of Japanese companies was understated.
Allowing for differences in valuation of assets and other accounting practices for a sample of large
Japanese companies in 1974,  the equity ratio increased from 16% to 47%, which was not much different
from that of UK or US companies  (Kuroda and Oritani 1980).
The leverage of Japanese  companies was probably quite high in the 1950s when companies  had
few reported or hidden reserves and their assets were valued at close to market prices.  The Japanese
practice of  relying on collateral security, operating cashflow and close relations between industrial
companies  and their financiers suggests  that banks may have been willing to allow companies,  especially
new or rapidly expanding  ones, to operate  with levels of bonrowing  and leverage  that would be considered
abnormally high in the UK or the US.  This could well be a major benefit of the existence of keiretsu
groups and the main bank system.  In addition, the govemment  financial institutions and the long-term
credit banks may have encouraged lending  to highly leveraged  firms in the 1950s  and early 1960s  when
15lending to priority sectors and for expanding capacity were the main targets of policy-based finance.
Successful and profitable companies were expected  to build reserves  and their assets to increase in value
(even though the legal prohibition on asset revaluation prevented their true value from being shown on
the balance  sheet). Over time, such companies  were able to lower the degree  of effective leverage  to more
normal and sustainable levels, both by building reserves and by repaying their bank loans.
Discussion  of the leverage of Japanese  corporations must also bear in mind the cxtensive use of
cross-shareholdings  among Keiretsu  firms.  It is generally estimated  that more than 75% of the equity of
large Japanese  firms is held by other firms in the same Keiretsu. A major part of this is held by financial
institutions, mainly insurance companies  and trust banks, though city banks also hold significant  shares.
If cross-shareholdings  are netted out, the leverage  position of Japanese  companies  would be much higher
than estimates based on the market value of assets and liabilities would indicate.  This would not
necessarily  imply a structural weakness  for Japanese  companies. Assessment  of the required equity base
of highly diversified groups of companies would depend on several factors such as the financial and
managerial independence  of different companies  in a Keiretsu group,  the covariance  of risks among group
companies,  the legal or moral recourse  that company creditors have on other group companies, etc.  The
prevalence  of the main bank system in the past suggests  that group resources were somehow available to
individual companies that might have been in distress, justifying the low "net" equity levels of keiretsu
groups.  But  if  individual companies become more independent and cross-shareholdings decline in
importance, then the true equity base of Japanese  companies might have to rise over time to levels that
would be closer to those prevailing in Anglo-American  countries.
The financial assets and liabilities  of the corporate sector and the flow of funds for five year
periods from 1961165  through 1986/90  are shown in Tables 9 and 10.  The high reported leverage of
Japanese  corporations is clear even though Table 9 does not include fixed assets, retained earnings and
the various reserves accumulated  by Japanese  companies. However,  Table 10 shows th,e  clear trend away
from reliance on bank loans and toward greater recourse to marketable securities, including issues of
foreign bonds. In the late 1  980s funds raised  through the issue of securities  represented over 20% of the
total sources of funds while loans from GFIs accounted for just over 6%.
The role of general trading companies.  A discussion  of Japanese  financial structure would not
be complete  without reference  to the role of general trading companies. Although their role has declined
in recent decades, they played a very important part during the reconstruction  and high growth era.
General trading companies were not financial institutions but they perfonned a major financial function
in many industries and were often described  as "quasi-banks". Trading companies provided finance to
a large number of small inrms  including manufacturers  and retailers as well as exporters and importers.
Much of their finance took the form of short-tenn and medium-tern trade credit, but a significant
proportion was also channelled as equity finance.  Trading companies  also provided technical assistance
with production, marketing and export strategies to smaller firms at the periphery of industrial groups.
They complemented their services with assessments of the credit standing of individual firms.  These
assessments  were used by city and other commercial  banks for their lending to smaller firms.
1IGeneral  trading companies had a significafit  advaiftagc  over commercial  banks in lending to small
and new companies at the periphery of the keiretsu groups.  By being involved in marketing and
production decisions, they had access to better and more reliable information on the prospects and
perfomiance of  individual companies.  They could also take corrective action more promptly when
problems arose. The decline in the relative role of general trading companies  over time suggests  that this
comparative advantage was more valuable during the reconstruction  and high growth era.
Restrictions on housing  loans and  consumer credit.  An important feature of the Japanese
financial system during the  high growthi  era was the low level of  lending to households for either
consumer credit or hiousing  finance.  Data for 1965 show that the main source of credit for households
was trade credit for consumer  goods and employer loans for housing. Total loans to households  amounted
to 3% of all lending  by financial institutions  and corresponded  to only 4% of GNP. Both housing finance
and consumer  credit started to increase in the 1970s,  reaching 17% of GNP by 1975 and 29% by 1985
(Tables 11 and  12).  Although these levels are lower than those prevailing in the United Kingdom and
the United States, they are comparable to those found in many continental European countries.  The
increasing importance of lending to households  and small firms is also shown in the changing structure
of bank loans over time (Table 13).  Lending  to households  rose fiom 6% of all bank loans in 1975 to
13% in 1990. At the same time, lending to small firms increased from 33% to 57%, while lending to
large enterprises fell fi-om  61% to 30%.
The discouragement of  lending to households during the high growth era had two important
results: first, it forced households  to maintain  a high rate of saving since lack of access  to credit required
accumulatioi. of a higher downpayment  for the purchase of consumer durables and houses; second, the
increased household savings were available to be lent to industry and thus to finance from domestic
sources the large investment  funding needs of the high growth era.  The financial assets and liabilities of
the personal  sector and sources and uses of funds  for five year periods from 1961/65  through 1986/90 are
shown in Tables 14 and  15. These  tables cover both households  and unincorporated  enterprises and thus
tend to exaggerate  the size of financial assets  of Japanese  households. Nevertheless,  the vast accumulation
of financial assets over time is evident from the data.  The willingness  of Japanese households  to invest
in low-yielding financial assets, even when the Japanese yen was not appreciating,  explains the absence
of a capital flight problem for Japan.  This is attributed to the success of the Japanese authorities in
protecting  the safety of bank deposits and other traditional financial assets  not only from bank failures but
also from the vagaries of inflation.
17111.  POLICY-BASED FINANCE
The role of policy-based  finance in the Japanese  financial  system is exaggerated  by some analysts
and commentators  and underrated by others. Policy-based  finaiice  was nol large by the standards  of most
other developing countries but it was not insignificant  either, especially during the reconstruction  period
of the early to mid-1950s. The changing objectives  of policy-based  finance are ofteni  overlooked, while
the fact that policy-based  finance was only one of several instrumcnts  of Japanese  industrial policy is not
always fully appreciated.  Moreover, policy-based finance was supported by several other aspects of
government policy on financial sector development. This section examines some basic aspects of the
operation of policy-based  finance in Japan.  The aspects considered  include the size and scope of policy-
based finance; shifting focus; implementing  institutions;  sources of funding; level of subsidy; duration;
design, appraisal and monitoring, and loan recovery and loan losses.
Size and  scope of policy-based finance.  The Japanese authorities established several policy-
based financial institutions in the early 1950s as part of official policy to provide long-tenn funds for
industrial investment, infrastructure,  housing and other purposes. These institutions were mostly funded
from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP), which was based on the resources mobilized by
postal savings, postal annuities and public pension systems and administered by the Trust Fund Bureau
of the Ministry of Finance.  Although policy-based finance for industry was clearly more important in
relative terms in the I  950s and early 1  960s, the total size and relative importance  of policy-based  finance
for all sectors of economic activity increased more or less steadily over the years.  This reflected the
success of postal savings in mobilizing resources as well as the growing financing needs of huusing and
other socioeconomic  sectors.
The total size of the FILP amounted to 4% of GCNP  in the 1950s, increased to 5% in the mid to
late 1960s,  fluctuated between 6.5% and 7.5% for most of the 1970s  and 1980s, and exceeded 8% in the
early 1990s. With regard  to total lending by the financial  system,  policy-based  finance accounted  for 13%
of the total in the mid-1950s, fell to 10% in the 1960s, but rose to 15% in the 1970s  and 1980s, before
declining again to 12% in the early 1990s.
Despite these generally low percentages,  policy-based  finance was an important source of funds
for industrial investment in the early reconstruction  and high growth era.  Their share in new industrial
equipment funds for all industrial sectors amounted to 31% in 1961,  fell to 17% in 1971, to 13% in 1981
and to 7% in 1991. But the relative importance  of FILP funds was much greater for the priority sectors
as well as for declining industries. It amounted to around 60% of equipment fund loans for the electric
power, ocean shipping and coal industries  and 33% for the iron and steel sector in 1961. Adding the loans
obtained from long-term  credit banks, which were then directly  and indirectly funded from the Trust Fund
Bureau, public support for the priority sectors exceeded  80% of their total equipment fund loans (Table
16).
These data refer to outstanding balances  that for 1961  also include the massive  support provided
in the first few years during the early reconstruction  period.  Looking at the new supply of industrial
equipment funds over the two periods covering the late 1950s and early 1960s, it can be seen that new
18GFI loans were large in relative quantitative tenns for only a hiandful  of industries, including marine
transportation, coal mining, and agriculture.  For manufacturing the reliance on  new GFI  loans for
equipment funds was 1  1% of total new sources of funds in the late 1950s  and dropped  to 10% in the early
1960s (Table 17).  Among manufacturing  subsectors,  the textile industry had a greater reliance on GFI
loans than other subsectors,  although  the machinery  subsector obtained around 90/e  of its funds fiom GFIs
(Table 18).  This is in line with the argument made by Japanese  officials that the role of GFIs was to
complement, rather than competc with, the private financial institutions. Their loans often had a pump
priming effect, a feature that is confirmed by the detailed empirical study reported by Calomiris and
Himmelberg (1994).
Shifting focus.  Japanese industrial policy, and policy-based  finance which was one of its main
instruments, changed focus on an almost continuous basis. Early emphasis was placed on restoring and
expanding productive capacity,  especially in the so-called priority sectors that provided important inputs
to  all other types of activities.  In the 1960s, the policy emphasis was shifted to modernizing and
technological upgrading of industrial capacity in order to strengthen  the international  competitiveness  of
Japanese industry.  The 1970s focused on restructuring of industrial capacity both at the company and
industry levels. Finally, in the 1980s  industrial policy promoted  diversification,  with particular emphasis
on high technology industries.
These  changes in emphasis  are reflected  in the distribution  of loans by government credit agencies.
The allocation of funds by the Japan Development  Bank underwent  considerable change. In 1961 50%
of outstanding  loans were for electric power, 27% for ocean shipping, 5% for coal mining and 9% for iron
and steel.  Priority sectors accounted thus for over 900%o  of all JDB lending.  The share of priority
industries declined to 63% by 1971 and to 44% in the 1980s.  Lending for chemicals and machinery
increased from 2.6% and 1.7% respectively in  1961 to 5.9% and 4.4% in 1971.  The biggest rise was
experienced  by lending for other purposes,  which covers lending for urban and regional development  and
for pollution control (Table  19).
The shifting focus of policy-based  finance at the industrial level was accompanied by changes in
the overall allocation of FILP funds (JDB/JERI 1994, Noguchi 1993). In the early 1950s,  29% of total
FILP  funds  was  allocated for  lending to  industry  and  technology,  11%  for  transportation and
communications, 8% for small business, 11% for agriculture, and the rest for other purposes including
regional development and housing. The share allocated to industry and technology fell to 14% in 1960,
6% in 1970 and 3% after 1975.  Small business lending increased to  13% in 1960, 15% in 1970 and
nearly 19% in 1980 before falling back to 16% in 1990. Housing  absorbed  a rising share of FILP funds,
going from 5% in the early 1950s  to 13% in 1960, 19% in 1970,  26% in 1980 and 30% in 1990. The
share absorbed by housing and other lending for social purposes  exceeded 50% in 1990 (Table 20).
Impleinenting institutions.  One of the distinguishing  features of policy-based finance in Japan
was its reliance on government  financial institutions  for channelling  funds  to selected  sectors. Commercial
banks were not subjected to detailed directed credit programs, but only to some general guidance that
favored lending  to industry rather  than to individuals,  real estate or speculative  ventures. Long-term credit
banks complemented  the activities of government  financial institutions,  especially in the 1950s  and 1960s
19when they were more heavily dependent on Trust Fund Bureau funds:. Government financial institutions
in Japan were enjoined  not to compete  with privatc sector  institutions  but rather to provide  complementary
finance and in effect to offer a "pump priming"  service  that would induce  privatc sector lenders to support
expanding firns  with good projects.  Government financial institutions enjoyed extensive managerial
autonomy in deciding which firms to support.
Sources of funding.  Immediately  after the war, policy-based loans that were provided by the
Reconstruction  Finance Bank (RFB) were effectively financed by central bank credit since the Bank of
Japan was the main buyer of the bonds issued by the RFB. This fuelled inflationary  pressures but after
the implementation  of the Dodge Stabilization  Plan and the adoption  of balanced  budgets in the late 1940s,
the Japanese authorities decided to fund policy-based loans from stable long-tern  savings.  A major
decision taken at the time was to avoid excessive  reliance on overseas  borrowings  and overseas injection
of capital. Thus, both access  to foreign debt and foreign direct investment  were discouraged. In addition,
the view prevailed  that as long as the banking  system could provide safe and convenient  savings facilities,
the Japanese  public would increase its financial savings, provided inflation  was kept under control.
Accumulation of  domestic financial savings was encouraged by the restrictions imposed on
consumer  credit and housing finance and by the high level of indirect  taxes imposed  on consumer  durables
that increased their cost and reduced their affordability.  The achievement  of high rates of economic
growth combined with declining rates of fertility contributed to the attainment of very high rates of
household saving that found its way in a massive build up of household financial assets in the fonn of
savings deposits with all types of banks and especially  with the postal savings  bank.  Postal savings were
the main source of funds for policy-based  loans.
Level of subsidy.  The level of subsidy  enjoyed by policy-based loans was low by international
standards, although its true  level is difficult to  determine since policy-based loans were free fiom
compensating  balance requirements. JDB data on interest rates show that the spread between JDB rates
and the long-term prime rate was as high as 3.5% in the mid-1950s, declined  to 2.5% in the early 1960s
and to  less than 2% after the mid-1960s, reaching less than 1% in the 1980s.  But if compensating
balances added between 1% and 5% to the cost of commercial bank loans, then the true interest rate
subsidy would have been much greater.
In many developing countries, preferential loans are extended at very low and fixed rates, which
become highly negative because  of the loss of monetary control by the authorities  and the occurrence of
very high rates of inflation.  In Japan, policy-based loans were also extended at fixed rates.  Highly
negative rates of interest on policy-based loans were avoided only because the authorities succeeded in
maintaining  price stability. In fact, on a couple  of occasions  when inflation got out of hand, policy-based
loans were offered at substantially  negative  rates in real terms.
Duration. One of the arguments in favor of policy-based  finance is its ability to overcome the
external  finance constraint faced by expanding  firms. This constraint  is more acute in raising term finance
as firms with a limited track record find it difficult to obtain long-term loans to finance their investment
in plant and machinery and other fixed assets.  Modern corporate finance highlights the preference of
20lcnders  for providing  short-term loans to industrial firms with the possibility of regular renewal based on
pcrfonniance. Short-term debt gives grater  control over the use of credit and over the performance and
behavior  of borrowers  than long-term finance. However,  firms investing  in fixed  assets arc often reluctant
to finance their investment  plans with short-term loans and thus be exposed to the whims and vagaries of
the lcnding policies of their banks.  Even in the US, the UK and continental European countries the
corporate sector has shown a preference for raising long-term funds to finance its long-term capital needs.
Hlence,  the growth of the long-term corporate bond market in the US, the development  of term facilities
in the curocurrency markets, and the use of term bank loans in Germany and other European countries.
In Japan, policy-based  finance provided  term loans  to industry for the financing of equipment and
other fixed assets, especially at a time when the corporate bond market was unable to fill this need.  The
equipment fund loans provided by the Japan Development Bank had an average remaining term to
maturity of 12.2 years in 1955. This declined  to 11.3 years in 1965 but compared with 3.3 and 4.8 years
respectively  for the three private long-term  credit banks  and 1.8 and 2.9 years respectively  for equipment
fund loans provided by city banks (JDB/JERI  1994).
Design, Appraisal and Monitoring.  Government  financial institutions  and the private long-term
credit  banks played a  very  important part in  screening potential borrowers and  in  appraising the
creditworthiness  of the industrial projects for which policy-based  finance was sought. Loan approval was
preceded by careful study of the design features of different projects and by independent and in-depth
appraisal of its economic and financial prospects. Once a project was approved,  disbursement of funds
was based on detailed documentation and progress  reports. After a loan was fully drawn, monitoring of
company performance  was then shared with the commercial  banks that were the main providers of short-
tern  finance. Thus, in the terminology developed  by Aoki (1994), government  financial institutions (and
long-term credit banks) specialized more in ex ante monitoring  while commercial  banks focused more on
interim monitoring.  Ex post monitoring, which is relevant only in the case of firms facing financial
difficulties and involves  rescue and restructuring operations,  was normally initiated by leading city banks
or  the  [ndustrial Bank of  Japan, acting as main banks for particular firms.  Govemment financial
institutions did not play leading parts in such monitoring.
Loan Recovery and  Loan Losses.  One of the most important characteristics  of policy-based
finance in Japan, a feature that sets it apart from the experience  of most other developing  countries, is the
very low level of loan losses. Partly because of the stricter emphasis on good project design, independent
credit appraisal and close monitoring and partly because  of the achievement  of very high growth rates over
a persistent period, loan losses in Japan were unusually  low. The Japan Development  Bank reported losses
of less than 0.1%, which were several times lower than those of commercial  banks. To some extent, this
reflected the care taken in screening borrowers. However, the very good record of loan recovery also
reflected the collateral security taken by JDB and in part also the absorption by the general budget of
losses from lending to declining industries, such as coal mining.
Industrial  Impact of Policy-Based Finance.  Empirically assessing  the impact of policy-based
finance is not easy.  Simple correlation of sectoral growth with sectoral credit support would not be a
meaningful test of the effectiveness and efficacy of policy-based finance if the objective of  credit
21assistance was not exclusively  growth promoting but also included supporting declining sectors in order
to minimize rcgional cconomnic  distortions  (c.g., thc casc of coal mining and shipbuilding in Japan)'.  A
mcaningful empirical examinationi  would require a careful compilation of relevant firm-level economic
data that could permit distinguishing  the effects oi credit policy fTom  oilier policics and could also allow
a direct test of the effiectivencss  of thec  rnn-lovel allocation  of credit. Such data arc not readily availabic.
Econometric  studies arc forced to usc accounting  data that often leavc too much to be desired. Moreover,
it is impossible to test against a counterfactual. i.c., what would have happened in the absence of
government credit policies.  The most empirical tests can achieve is to establish significant correlations
that would lend support to one or other argument or claim.
Two empirical studies have been undertaken recently that lend support to the argument that
Japanese policy-based finance was effective in meeting its objectives  of "pump priming" and "crowding
in" private credit for growing firms in  industries that benefit from dynamic comparative advantage.
Horiuchi and Sui (1993) compared the  investment behavior of  "medium-size" firms receiving JDB
assistance  with other firms of similar size over the period E964-1988. Tihey  found that the year of initial
JDB lending was associated with increased investment  and also that within three years finns began to
move away from reliance on JDB lending to rely more on private banks.  Horiuchi and Sui also found
that directed credit was more effective for firmns  that did not have main bank affiliations.
Calomiris and Himmelberg  (1994) examined  the effect of policy-based finance over the period
1963-1991 for the machine tool industry, an industry selected for its high potential for spillover effects
due to technological  innovation  and learning. Calomiris  and Himmelberg  found that there was  no capture
of government funds either at the industry or firm level. Directed credit was usually provided to a firm
only once and it lasted for a brief period.  They also found that government credit was provided to
growing, large, capital intensive firmns  with higher investment  rates. Moreover, directed credit appeared
to bolster the positive characteristics  of recipient firms and thus to reinforce the process  of consolidation,
investment  and technological  change of the finns to which government  credit was targeted. Government
credit also had a significant, positive impact on investment  and was positively correlated with private
credite.
3  In this respect, the findings of Beason and Weinstein (1993), who claim that by supporting
declining industries directed credit programs retarded growth, would not be  relevant.  Their work
implicitly  assumes that allowing a collapse  of coal mining (and other declining industries)  that might have
happened in the absence of government support would not have affected the average growth rate of the
Japanese economy, despite the massive  regional economic distortions  such collapse would have entailed.
4  TThe  results reported in Calomiris and Himmelberg  (1994) were weaker than those reported in an
earlier paper (Calomixis  and Himmelberg 1993)  that focused  on the period 1982-91. The main reason for
the weaker results seems to be the use of a different methodology  in conducting  the empirical tests.  But
another reason may a selection bias in the larger sample covering the longer period as firms that exited
in the 1960s and 1970s  are not included in the dataset that basically  includes surviving firms.  If exiting
firns  were low-investxnent,  poor-performance  firms while surviving finms were more likely to receive
government  credit, then the effect of govemment  credit would  be under-estimated. In addition, accounting
data for the earlier years are probably less reliable.
22TbC studies using firm-lovel  data provide support to the oft-made claim of Japanese  officials that
policy-based  finance made a positive contribution  to industrialization  and economic  devolopment. Given
the small relative size of the policy-based industrial funds, which oven in the 1950s  amounted tc less  than
5% of the total funds mobilized by the financial system, but declined over timc to less than 1% in the
1970s and  1980s, no claim can be made that policy-based finance was the main factor behind Japan's
economic success. The studies do not show that the roquired  finance could not have boen obtaincd from
private sources, but they suggest that policy-based finance acted as a catalyst for financing particular
scctors  or firms, supporting  the argument  of Japancse  ofricials with regard  to the "pump-priming"  function
and "crowding in" effect of policy-based  finance.
23IV.  THE'  hOLE Olt CREDIBLE  VISIONS
As already noted, a very important factor behind  the success  of policy-based  finance in Japan was
the ability of government  agencies to implement  policy, appraise  projects,  monitor perfonnance and ensure
compliance. The fact that policies were designed in extensive and effective  consultations  with the private
sector facilitated  their acceptance  and stimulated  cooperation  in their implementation. But an important
factor was also the existence of an official vision of the aims and instruments  of industrial policy that
enjoyed extensive support  from  the  private  sector and  provided a  framework for  designing and
implementing new measures and for stimulating effective private sector response.  Effective visions
implied not only credibility, consistency and continuity but also flexibility and adaptability to changing
circumstances. The effectiveness of the official vision increased with the positive outcomes of early
measures, which reinforced its credibility and acceptability.
Industrialization.  A very lucid exposition  of what may be described as the Japanese  vision for
industrialization  was made in the statement  by Ojimi (Vice  Minister of MITI) in 1970 and included in the
OECD study on the Industrial Policy of Japan that was published in 1972. According  to Ojimi (1972):
"The Ministry of International Trade and Industry decided to establish in Japan industries  which
require intensive employment of capital and technology, industries that in  consideration of
comparative cost of production should be the most inappropriate for Japan, industries such as
steel, oil refining, petro-chemicals,  automobiles,  aircraft, industrial machinery of all sorts, and
electronics,  including electronic computers. From a short-run static u%ewpoint,  encouragement  of
such industries would seem to  conflict with economic rationalism.  But, from a long-range
viewpoint, these  are  precisely the  industries where  income elasticity of  demand  is  high,
technological  progress is rapid, and labor productivity  rises fast.  It was clear that without these
industries  it would be difficult to employ a population of 100  ;.  I  '.on and raise their standard of
living to that of Europe and America with light industry alone;  whether right or wrong, Japan
had to have these heavy and chemical industries."
T'he  Ojimi statement did not provide any documentation  in support of the claimed orientation of
industrial policy.  In fact, some authors have implied an ex post rationalization  on the part of MITI by
describing the statement  as an authoritative  retrospective  statement  of MITM's  accomplishments. However,
in his seminal work on the Japanese miracle,  johnson (1982) provided  detailed references  to the evolution
of industrial policy 5. According to Johnson, the first plan to develop a comprehensive approach to
industrialization  and exports was the plan entitled "On Making Our Economy Independent".  which was
prepared as early as 1953  when Okano (a former president  of Sanwa Bank) was MITT  Minister. The plan,
which became known as the Okano Plan, outlined a new effort to expand exports, called for closer ties
with South East  Asian countries and for a rationalization  of the tax system,  advocated  a vigorous program
to develop import-substituting  industries,  and underlined  the importance  of expanding  heavy and chemical
industries that had a much higher income elasticity of demand than Japan's traditional light industries.
This is also strongly emphasized in work by Yotopoulos (1991).
24The Okano Plan was initially  rejected but its ideas  were incorporated  in subsequent  statements  of strategy,
such as MITI's  1954 paper entitled "Outline of the New International  Trade and Industry Policy".
The Okano ideas were later supplemented  with the notion of complementarity  between exports
and domestic sales as means for promoting large scale and lowering costs.  As stated in Johnson (1982,
p. 229), the idea was thate:
"MITI should promote both exports and domestic sales.  When problems in the intemational
balance of payments  arose, the government  could curtail domestic demand and promote exports;
when the problems  of paying for imported raw materials eased, the focus should be on enlarging
sales at home.  If this could be achieved, Japan's factories could keep operating throughout all
phases of the business cycle."
Another example  of a successful  vision was the "income doubling" plan that was adopted in the
early  1960s.  This  is  well documented in the JDB/JERI study (JDB/JERI 1994).  The plan was
characterized by tremendous success and overshooting  of most targets, although there were substantial
costs in terms of pollution, congestion and other aspects  of the quality of life. In fact, the plan itself and
the response to its side effects represent an example of effective shifting of focus and flexibility in the
formulation of official visions and the design and implementation  of policies.
Finaneial  Sector Development.  The adoption of credible visions also had implications for
policy-based finance and the development of the financial sector.  Credit policies are only one of the
industrial policy instruments.  Although Japanese officials emphasize the superiority of policy-based
finance over direct budget subsidies and grants in promoting industrialization,  Japan made extensive use
of  accelerated depreciation allowances and tax-free special reserves.  These allowed profitable and
successful firms in the promoted sectors to retain and reinvest a larger part of their profits than firms in
nontargeted sectors.  Particularly important because of  its link with the overall  strategy of  export
promotion and export push was the special reserve that was linked to past export perfonnance.  These
noncredit-based incentives  reinforced the impact of credit policies and helped to stress the credibility of
the programs.
Another aspect of the Japanese  official vision regarded the somewhat low priority assigned to the
development of the financial sector. Most statements  of Japanese  officials implied that industrialization
and economic growth took precedence  over the development  of an efficient and modem financial sector.
6  This idea was attributed to Ishibashi and was implemented  with a vengeance by Ikeda. Johnson
makes much of the role of some influential MITI ministers, especially Ishibashi and Ikeda, who later in
their career became prime ministers and adopted an activist approach in  industrial affairs.  Tanzan
Ishibashi was MITT  minister between October 1954 and December 1956 and served as prime minister
between December 1956 and February 1957.  Hayato Ikeda was MITI minister on several occasions
(February to April 1950, October  to November 1952, June 1959  to July 1960), finance minister between
December 1956 and June 1959, and served as prime minister between July 1960 and November 1964
when the "income doubling" plan was adopted.  Other prime ministers who served as MIT  ministers
include Bisaku Sato, Kiichi Miyazawa, Kakuei Tanaka and Yasuhiro Nakasone.
25To be sure, the authorities  were committed to ensure the safety of deposits and the solvency of financial
intermediaries  but were less concerned to allow banks and other finai,cial intermediaries  to innovate and
develop new services  aiming at reducing the cost of financial intermediation. The latter was controlled
by the authorities and was set at levels that ensured adequate  profitability for the banks but not excessive
rents.  The benefits from repressed interest rates on small savings were passed on to the corporate sector
as were the benefits from tax allowances.  Dividends by both financial intermediaries  and nonfinancial
entities were kept under control.  Although savers were penalized through low interest and dividend
income on their financial assets, they were the beneficiaries  of economic expansion, higher wages, and
more secure employment. In addition, thrift was promoted by educational campaigns.
This approach to the financial sector fitted well with the strategy and global vision described
above.  Japanese officials have often claimed that they relied on indirect finance and credit policies
because of the underdevelopment  of securities markets, but over the first thirty years of the postwar era
they applied measures that prevented the growth and maturation of these markets.  Controls on interest
rates on bank loans and deposits were accompanied by branching restrictions, merger controls, and
administrative guidance.  Both consumer  credit and housing finance were discouraged, at least until the
mid-1970s.  Although commercial banks were  not  subject to  directed credit programs, the  use of
administrative  guidance and their close links with industrial groups  ensured that they provided substantial
support to  industrial companies, especially in terms of working capital funds.  The banks were also
encoaraged  to become members of keiretsu as a result of both the designated institutions approach of the
war period and the increased limits for cross shareholdings  that were applied in the early 1960s.
Reliance  on  a  Competitdve Private  Sector.  UnliKe many other developing countries, the
Japanese official vision did not place undue importance  on the public ownership of industrial enterprises
or even of financial institutions. Although some utilities were under public ownership until the recent
wave of  privatizations, the Japanese economic structure was remarkable for  the  low level  of state
ownership.  Official policy favored the establishment  and development of large competitive industrial
groups that were under Japanese  ownership  and management. Recourse  to foreign debt and equity capital
was discouraged and even  joint ventures  played a small part in Japanese  industrial  development. A special
effort was made to promote the emergence  of rival large groups with sufficiently large scale to ensure
achievement of satisfactory economies of scale and intenational competitiveness. To this end, official
policy supported the creation of keiretsu  groups and the close links between  industrial groups and financial
institutions, even though commercial banks were prevented from becoming universal banks in the sense
of German banks. MITT  played an important part in organizing cartels to achieve a smooth reduction in
productive capacity when Japanese industry was faced with declining demand for their products or was
suffering from the build-up of excessive  capacity.
Private ownership was also preponderant in the financial sector.  Apart from the govemment
financial institutions that were created  to fill perceived  market gaps in the provision of finance to specific
economic sectors, most banks, insurance companies and securities finns were privately owned, either
through joint  stock companies or through cooperatives owned by their  members.  The latter were
particularly important among farmers, artisans, and small traders. Private financial institutions  were not
forced to  lend to  particular sectors or companies while even government financial institutions were
26genierally  free to imakc  ilicir lcnding decisions  on economic  criteria and enjoyed managerial  autonomy and
freedom  from political interfecrence.
Consultation. The existence of a coherenit  and credible vision did not imply that it was inspired
and imposed by govemrnient  bureaucrats on an unwilling private sector. On the contrary, most studies of
Japanese  and East Asian finance and industrial  policy emphasize  the close links and extensive consultation
betweeni  bureaucrats and representatives  of the private sector'.  There was extensive reliance on various
del  iberative  councils and constant exchange  of information  and ideas  between  government  and the business
sector. Participatory government and a close partnership  between government, financial institutions and
industrial finns helped overcome pervasive market imperfections  (Cho and Hellmann 1993).
The existence  of a coherent and credible  vision also lent credibility to the consultation processes
and deliberative councils.  Many other countries around the world tried to promote close consultation
between government and the private sector but, in the absence of a coherent vision, such exchanges
became either forums for special pleading or ineffective  talk shops.
A  very  important contribution of  Japanese government agencies was the  compilation and
dissemination  of information  about longer  term sectoral prospects,  an activity that is not readily undertaken
by the private sector and private securities markets where much greater emphasis is placed on collecting
data with short-term payoffs (e.g. price discovery  in futures markets). Again the existence of a credible
vision and the carrot and stick approach that was used to encourage cooperation  resulted in the collection
and analysis of broadly reliable data about particular industrial sectors 3.
Proof that the strategic vision was not imposed from above is provided in Japan by the few
examples when bureaucrats were  perceived to  have gone too  far  and  the  business sector fought
successfully  against the adoption  of particular laws. Perhaps  the best example was provided by the defeat
of the 1963  draft law on Special Measures  for the Promotion  of Designated  Industries, which was rejected
because of opposition to granting explicit draconian controls to MITI officials (Tsuruta 1988, Johnson
1982).
Long-Run  Cost.  The almost single-minded pursuit of rapid industrialization and economic
growth, especially under the income doubling  plan, was not cost free. Several  types of cost were incurred.
First, the policy of rapid industrialization  led in several instances  to the building of capacity that turned
out to be excessive when international  circumstances  changed (Tsuruta 1988). This required policies of
7  Ohmae (1982) went further, arguing that there was extensive cooperation and cohesion between
corporate managers and workers. He pointed out that in Japan a corporation was seen as an assembly of
people, each known as a  member (not an employee).  He also stressed the  importance of primary
education and the role of the government as coach, not captain.
s  However, it should also be noted that some Japanese bureaucrats and scholars have argued that
the deliberative councils were not  very effective and the infonnation collected and publicized was
persistently off the mark (Miwa 1988, Tsukuda 1993).
27aIdLjusIRlcInI  .nd  capacity redLCtioll  whicl  often mcant thc dismantling of relatively modem plant and
cqtLipillieit.  Thiis  approach was Facilitated by the vcTy generous depreciation policics that  allowed
companllics,  esplecially  export-orieiited  ones, to sci up largc reserves. The best knowin  example  ol thlis  cost
ol  cxcess c:apacity  is  lounid in the shipbuLilding industry but  other  sectors  also  suffered  from  similar
problems  anid  reqtuircd  coordinated reductions in capacity.
'Ilic seconid  cost ol (Ile policy of rapid industrialization  was the pollution of the cnvironment.
Many coninicnilators  havc drawn att. .!ion to the serious pollutioii of air and water that happened during
the Iigih growvth  era (Yamamnura  1993).  1{owever,  since the early 1970s Japanese official policy has
supported ell'oris  to improve  thc quality of the environment  and the quality of life more generally  and this
has been  reflected in thic  chanige  in the directionj  of loans granted for FILP financed projects.
Ilie tihird  type  of cost was the neglect of housing and other social infrastructure. The relatively
low quality of housing in Japan is partly due to the scarcity  of land and the overcrowded  living conditions,
especially compared to the  United States where land and space are in much greater supply.  But at least
until ile in  id-  1  970s official policy  generally neglected  the need to promote more spacious  and comfortable
accommodation for middle income families. Although great support has been provided in recent years
to the housing sector through government financial institutions and other means, the quality of housinig
continues to be low and its cost highi for the level of real per capita income that Japan has achieved
through its rapid industrialization  and economic growth policies.
The  fourthl  type of cost was the relatively slow development  of tie financial sector.  Although,
as  alrcady  emphasized  above, in a  quantitative  sense, the Japanese system is highly advanced, in
qualitative terms the system has been slow to adopt new financing techniques and practices.  When
financial markets were significantly liberalized  in the 1980s,  they lacked the experience and expertise to
handle their new freedoms  constructively  and prudently  and the result was the bubble economy  of the late
1980s and the financial losses and crisis that followed the bursting of that bubble.  To be sure, the
financial systems  of most Anglo-American  countries  (including  the United States)  as well as Scandinavian
countries also suffered from major excesses  and crises during the same period. But the situation in Japan
seems to have gone  farther and to have involved bigger  and more persistent mistakes  than in most of these
other countries. Thus, the financial losses of the late 1  980s and early 1  990s could be seen as a long-term
cost of the industrialization  policies pursued in the 1960s  and 1970s. Although the benefits of that policy
may still exceed the costs, the latter are real and may require a radical adjustment of policies, not only
in order to deal with them but also in order to prevent their recurrence.
The Blurring of the Vision. Althouglh  Japanese policy has been adapted over the years to cope
with these challenges. the momentum acquired by the pro-industrialization  forces has created a certain
imbalance in the Japanese  economy that is the source of almost continuous friction with other countries.
The large and persistent  trade and current account surpluses  and the accompanying  large outflows of long-
term capital have given  rise to concerns about the domination  of particular markets by Japanese interests.
The importance of the vision of Ishibashi and Ikeda,  which was emphasized  by Johnson. can now
be seen more clearly. That vision was based on the complementarity  between exports and domestic sales
28in ensuring large scalc  and low costs.  Of coursc,  as many commentators  liavc observed  (Patrick 1986,
Johnison  1982),  it is mticih  easier  to develop  and inpicnient  a clear and  credible visioIl when an cconomy
is catchlinlg  up economically and tcchnologically withi other more advanced  countries than wheln it  is
lcading the world or is on a par with other world  leaders. Yet the old vision is no longcr relevant,  nlow
that Japan is a major industrial power and a highily successful  and efficient exporter.  Whal is probably
iiceded is a new visioIn  that focuses  on the need  to develop further the social infrastructure  of the country
and bring it to a level that is commensurate  with its high level of income. But as markets  are now mucih
more complex and sophisticated,  the new vision would probably  requirc much less  selective  intervention
and could be limited to ensuring  a redirection of effort away from industry and industrial exports and
toward social iilrastructure  and services  as well as  toward the development  of a more efficient financial
system.
29V.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
Japaniese  linancial  and  industrial  policy liad one overriding  objective  over  most of the  postwar
pcriod: to proimote rapid industrializationi and accelcrate economic  development  in order  to catcih up with
thc more econiomiiically  and techinologically advanced countries in Europe and North  America.  To  this cnd,
inidustrializationi  tolok priority  ovcr financial sector development.  In fact. the financial sector was tighitly
rcgLulatcd  to cnsurLe  an adequate supply oh' industrial funids at reasonable  cost.
Finanicial  regUilations  that affected the pace and direction of financial sector development  included
a  1Iragnentation and  segmentation  of the financial  system,  merger and branching  controls,  interest  rate
ceilings,  tighlt  regulationi of bond and equity  issues, foreign  exchange  controls, including  restrictions  on
foreign  direct  investment  and,  last but by no  means  least. restrictions  on consumer  credit  and  housing
finanice. Il  addition,  government  financial institutions and policy-based finiance played a significant  part
in channcling  funds to priority  sectors or activities.
The low interest  rate ceilings on consumer  deposits and the restrictions  on  consumer  credit  and
housing  finance, coupled  with the foreign exchange controls that prevented investnent  in overseas assets,
combined  to stimulate  the accumulation  of household  financial assets.  The  latter was facilitated  by the
role played by the postal savings system. whiich  offered convenience and proximity that was denied to the
large commercial  banks by the branching  controls.  In addition,  the success of the Japanese authorities  in
preventing  any  losses to depositors  from  bank failures  as well as their success in keeping  inflation  low
and  thus  avoiding  an erosion  of  the  real value  of  household  deposits  bolstered  the  confidence  of  the
Japanese public  in the  safety  of  their financial  assets and  contributed  to  the  continuing  high  flow  of
Financial saving  despite the generally  low returns.
The Japanese authorities  also encouraged  the emergence of industrial  groups and  the main  bank
system as a means for keeping  Japanese industry under  local ownership  and control and  for  facilitating
the  exchange of information.  The authorities also established specialized government  financial institutions
that chaninieled  funds collected  from  the postal savings  system to firms in high priority  sectors, to firms
in modernizing  and restructuring  sectors, to exporting  firms and to smaller firns  that had  no  links with
the  large industrial  groups.  Both the main bank system and government  financial institutions  were used
as a substitute for  some of the  functions that were played  by the capital markets  in countries  with more
developed  and sophisticated  financial systems.  A  considerable  advantage of the Japanese approach  was
the stricter  monitoring  of the performance of borrowers  it implied.  The Japanese approach  also avoided
the  instability  and short-termn orientation that capital markets  could  impart on the economy.
Policy-based  finance  was only one of several industrial  policy instruments  used by the Japanese
authorities.  Other  instruments  included  tariffs,  direct  grants  and,  especially,  tax-free  reserves  for
depreciation and other purposes.  But policy-based finance played a crucial part in overcoming the external
finance constraint facing new or expanding firms, especially those with no links with industrial groups and
limited support  from the  main bank system.
30Most developing countries operated directed credit programs but few implemented  policy-based
finance in an efficient and effective way.  In Japan, policy-based finance had a narrow focus and its
objectives evolved with the changing industrial circumstances of the country.  Early support for high
priority sectors gave way first to equipment  modemization and then to industrial restructuring and more
recently to industrial diversification.  Interest subsidies were kept low, partly because of the success in
keeping inflation low.
But the biggest  difference with most developing  countries was  in the management  of the programs.
A distinguishing feature of the Japanese  experience  was the reliance on government financial institutions
for implementing  policy-based  finance. Commercial  banks were not subjected  to directed  credit programs.
Moreover, both commercial banks and government financial institutions enjoyed extensive managerial
autonomy in making lending decisions on economic criteria and in deciding which firms to support.
Monitoring of borrowers was very effective and loan losses were kept to very low levels.
Throughout  the postwar period, industrialization,  financial sector development and policy-based
finance were guided by a credible official vision that emphasized the developmnent  of industries with
dynamic  comparative advantage, high  income elasticity, rapid  technological progress  and  rising
productivity. The official vision also emphasized  the complementarity  between  export and domestic sales
in helping Japanese industry achieve large scale and low, intemationally competitive,  costs.  The vision
did not place undue importance on the public ownership  of industrial enterprises  or financial institutions.
On the contrary, it relied on a competitive,  efficient and dynamic private sector.
The vision itself was not imposed  from above but was developed  after extensive consultation  with
representatives  of the private sector. Even so, the almost single-minded  pursuit of rapid industrialization
had several long-run costs in the form of frequent build-up of excess capacity, serious pollution of the
environment,  neglect of housing and social infiastructure,  and relative underdevelopment  of the financial
sector.  The failure to promote a more sophisticated  financial system was reflected in the mistakes and
misjudgments  of the mid-1980s that fuelled the bubble economy of the late 1980s  and led to substantial
financial losses following the bursting of that bubble.
Now that Japan has succeeded in catching up with the advanced countries of Europe and North
America, the old vision is no longer relevant  What is probably needed is a new vision that will develop
social infrastructure further and will ensure a redirection of effort away from industry and industrial
exports.  As markets are now much more complex and sophisticated,  the new vision would probably
require less selective intervention and a greater emphasis  on developing  more efficient financial markets
that would facilitate the required reallocation  of resources.
For other developing countries, the lessons of Japan lie not so much in the similarities that may
exist between  Japanese industrial and financial  policies and the policies pursued in different countries but
rather in the large and important differences in implementing  these policies and especially in managing
the policies of mild financial  repression and policy-based  finance that characteized Japan during the high
growth era.
31Therc are many developing countries around the world that face strong pressures for growth
policies that would emphasize industrialization  and would be based on the principle of shared growth.
This would imply the creation of economically  sustainable  jobs to absorb large and growing numbers of
young and older workers.  In several countries, employment  creation would appear to be of paramount
importance for their medium-term economic and political stability. In other countries, problems of job
creation are more concentrated in particular regions (e.g. the rural areas of Latin American countries).
The experience of Japan and other East Asian countries has many relevant lessons for these countries.
Arguments that suggest  that the Japanese  experience  cannot be replicated are too pessimistic  and disregard
the impact and influence of Japanese policies on other high performing East Asian countries.
However, as emphasized by Page (1994) and Leipziger  and Thomas (1994), what is generally
required by developing countries is pragmatic policymaking  that shows flexibility and adaptability to
changing circumstances.  The main role of  policymakers is to  develop a  long-term vision that  is
economically credible and  is shared by  key participants in the growth process.  The vision should
emphasize the importance  of stable macroeconomic  and financial policies, fiscal discipline  and moderate
inflation, high rates of saving and investment,  outward orientation and export development,  reliance on
a  competitive private  sector, close consultation between government officials  and  private  sector
representatives, and a major effort on education and developing labor skills.  Great reliance should also
be placed on inward foreign direct investment  to benefit from the supply of foreign capital and transfer
of technology.
Despite the growth of global financial markets, a policy of mild financial repression favoring
industrial investmnent  and discouraging (frivolous) consumption  would still be appropriate. In addition,
policy-based finance could still be used to support  job-creating small firms or export activities, although
care should be taken to minimize the share of resources absorbed by inefficient, inward-oriented  state-
owned enterprises (the basic ingredients of successful credit policies are summarized in Vittas and Cho
1994). Implementation  of these  financial policies  would require  the creation of strong economic  ministries
and financial institutions that enjoy managerial autonomy and are able to take decisions on economic
criteria but are accountable for their performance. Special emphasis would also need to be placed on
improving the appraisal of new projects and the perfornance monitoring of different firms.
Unfortunately, many developing  countries  do not appear  to have  the political will and institutional
capacity to develop and implement effectively such outward-oriented,  growth-promoting policies.  It is
mainly for this reason that replicating the Japanese  and East Asian experience in other parts of the world
is often perceived as infeasible.  What is needed is better government that can help mitigate, if not
overcome, the well-known imperfections  and failures of financial  markets (World Bank 1989).
32Table  1
Deposits,  Savings,  Certificates  of Deposits  and Bank Debentures
(trillion yen)
TOTAL  Banks  Trust  Insur  Agric  Other
Fund  Comp  Coop
Bureau
1945  0.3  0.1  0.05  0.01  0.02  0.01
1950  1.8  1.2  0.2  0.06  0.1  0.05
1960  18.8  13.2  1.9  0.9  0.8  0.4
1970  107.7  67.2  13.7  6.6  6.2  3.5
1980  499.3  272.4  97.0  30.9  27.5  16.5
1988  1094.3  559.7  209.3  108.5  47.3  36.8
Notes:  Totals  include  overlapping  accounts,  i.e.,  inter-
financial institutions  deposits.
Banks include city banks, regional banks,  trust banks,
long-term credit banks,  sogo banks  and shinkin banks.
Trust  fund bureau  includes postal  savings.
Other includes  the Shokochukin  and Norinchukin  banks.
The series  is discontinued  after  1988.
Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic  Statlstics  Annual,  1989  (pp.
163-166)  and 1988  (pp 161-164).
Table  2
Size of the Financial  Sector relative  to GNP
1960  1970  1980  1988
TOTAL  (tn yen)  18.8  107.7  499.3  1094.3
GNP  (tn yen)  16.7  75.2  245.4  379.2
% GNP  113  143  203  289
Source:  Bank of Japan, Econnmic  Statistics  Annual,  1991 p. 10 and Table
33Table  3
City  Bank  Domestic  Branch  Networks
1960  1970  1990  1990
Sanwa  186  +18  204  +20  224  +37  261
Fuji  182  +22  204  +20  224  .50  274
Mitsubishi  158  +24  182  +21  203  +46  249
Sumitomo  137  +39  176  +26  202  +123  325
Mitsui  100  145  145  +16  161  +33  194
Nihon  Kangyo  118  +25  143
Dai  Ichi  Kangyo  +30  318  +36  344
Dai  Ichi  97  +48  145
Source:  Aoki,  Patrick  and  Sheard  (1994).
34Table  4
Branch  Networks
1953  1960  1970  1980  1990
City banks  1821  1791  2409  2714  3474
Regional  banks  3602  3822  4335  5675  7456
Sogo  banks  2089  2485  2844  3846  4708
Shinkin  banks  2045  2698  3871  5637  8122
All  banks  9643  10221  13755  18242  24313
Agric  Coops  12882  11876  17423  17179  16218
Post  offices  15419  1577B  20551  23005  24107
Source:  Bank  of  Japan,  Economic  Statistics  Annual  (various  isoues)
35Table  5
Trust  Fund Bureau  and Postal Savings Balances
(trillion yen)
Trust Fund  Share in Total  Postal  Savings
Bureau
1945  0.066  17.5%  0.047
1950  0.256  8.6%  0.155
1960  2.1  6.0%  1.1
1970  14.6  7.2%  7.7
1980  100.1  12.4%  62.0
1990  244.9  11.5%*  133.7
Notes:  Total  includes  deposits,  savings,  certificates  of
deposits  and bank debentures  given  in Table  1.
*  Refers  to share  in 1988.
Source:  Bank of Japan,  Economic  Statistics  Annual,  1991  (pp.
101 and 104) and 1988  (pp. 99 and 102).
36Table 6
Loans and Discounts  of Financial Inmtitutioni  (trillion  yen)
Total  Banks  Trust  Govt  Insur  Agric  Other
Fund  Fin  Comp  Coop
Bureau  Inst
1945  0.1  0.1  ..  ..
1950  1.5  1.1  0.1  0.1  0.01  0.03  0.05
1960  15.9  10.6  1.5  1.5  0.5  0.3  0.4
1970  91.1  56.5  10.3  7.8  4.0  3.1  2.8
1980  385.5  201.8  76.2  42.0  16.8  1±.1  11.5
1988  779.7  442.8  145.8  76.6  36.7  12.7  20.5
Notes:  Total  includes overlapping accounts, i.e.,  inter-financial
institutions  loans.
Banks  include  city  banks,  regional  banks,  trust  banks,  long-term
credit banks, sogo banks and shinkin  banks.
Other includes  the Shokochukin  and Norinchukin  banks.
The series is discontinued  after 1988.
Source: Bank of Japan,  Economic  Statistics  Annual,  1989 (pp.  167-168)
and 1988 (pp.  165-166).
37Table 7
Securities  Holdings  of Financial  Institutions  (trillion yen)
Total  Banks  Trust  Gov  Insur  Agric  Other
Fund  Fin  Comp  Coop
Bureau  Inst
3945  0.14  0.06  0.048
1950  0.27  0.14  0.078
1960  3.2  2.2  0.4  ..  0.3  ..  0.06
1970  17.8  9.7  3.4  0.03  1.7  0.2  0.6
1980  119.8  62.9  20.8  0.3  10.2  2.0  5.9
1988  338.6  160.3  62.4  0.7  51.3  2.0  12.6
Notes:  Total includes overlapping accounts, i.e.  , certificates and  bank
debentures  held by other  financial  institutions.
Banks include city banks, regional banks, trust banks, long-term
credit banks,  sogo banks  and shinkin banks.
Other  includes  the Shokochukin  and Norinchukin  banks.
The series  is discontinued  after  1988.
Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic  Statlatics  Annual,  1989 (pp. 169-70) and
1968  (pp. 167-168).
38Table  8
Loans  and Discounts  of Government  Financial  Institutions
(billion yen)
Total  JDB  SBFC  PFC  EXIM  AFFFC  HLC
1955  685  374  45  48  39  82  85
1960  1519  538  148  125  125  195  202
1970  7836  1705  895  709  1522  955  1070
1980  41958  5018  4351  4024  5077  3706  12733
1990  83722*  9473  7309  7096  6252  5324  40303
Notes:  JDB:  Japan Development  Bank.
SBFC:  Small Business  Finance Corporation.
PFC:  People's  Finance  Corporation.
SXIN:  Export  Import Bank of Japan.
APFFC:  Agriculture Fisheries and  Forestry Finance Corporation.
HLC:  Housing  Loan Corporation.
*  refers  to 1989.
Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic  Statiatics  Annual,  various  issues.
39Table  9
Financial  Assets  and Liabilities  of Corporate  Sector  (billion yen)
1955/12  1960/12  1971/3  1981/3  1991/3
Total  assets  na  12847  83122  276993  668961
Cash  na  150  442  1492  3137
Demand  deposits  784  1687  9868  30563  44344
Time/savings  dep  775  2251  14525  47235  134118
Securities  na  1018  4039  17688  156850
Trust  accounts  na  210  1322  5390  38700
Trade  credit  2566  7323  51765  163813  255030
Liabilities
PFI loans  3893  10135  56315  174266  435397
GFI loans  506  6181  21189  63759  63759
Domestic  bonds  227  693  3151  10307  39715
Foreign  bonds  --  --  --  1768  32514
Stocks  964  2827  8985  16977  64989
Trade  credit  1973  5646  40580  132789  196657
Source:  Bank  of  Japan,  Economic  Statistics  Annual,  various
issues.
40Table  10
Flow of Funds  of Corporate  Sector  (billion yen)
Sources of Funds
Loans  (PFI)  (GFI)  Stocks  Domest  Foreign  Trade
Bonds  Bonds  Credit
1961/65  17126  15746  1380  3334  1056  --  8255
1966/70  33311  29882  3430  2491  1358  --  20476
1971/75  73956  66657  7299  5307  3650  407  37600
1976/80  62756  53832  8743  6178  3505  999  38406
1981/85  101864  93571  8293  8943  3458  6812  19362
1986/90  182406  163045  19361  24152  10496  26001  62325
Uses of Funds
Cash  Demand  Time  Secur  Trust  Trade
Save  Credit
1961/65  121  3359  4437  1842  356  10574
1966/70  199  5011  7474  1448  655  27024
1971/75  574  14129  14974  4427  i832  46590
1976/80  477  6916  17856  7209  2840  48603
1981/85  521  9769  31454  10433  4933  30752
1986/90  3946  15281  58267  12334  30320  82789
Note:  Except  for 1961/65,  all figures  are for fiscal years.
Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic  Statistics  Annual,  various  issues.
41Table  11
New Loans  to Personal  Sector
(billion yen)
1965  1970  1975  1980  1984  1985
Housing  loans  64  1010  5137  9673  10402  11886
Consumer  loans  1016  2929  7261  20529  31610  34706
Loans  243  777  1890  9429  14706  17866
Installment
Credit  88  600  1446  3548  6840
Finance  Co.  1  a  342  2118  2788  2486
PFIs  87  592  1104  1430  4052
Non-installment
Credit  155  177  444  5881  7866
Pawn  Shop  155  177  204
Post  Office  240
Sales  Credit  773  2152  5371  11100  16904  16840
Installment  2020  4751  10083  14435  9769
Non-installment  132  620  1017  2469  7071
Source:  Shohisha Shinyou Toukei  (Consumer Credit Statistics),  1978 (for
the data of 1965),  1981  (for the data  of 1970  and 1975),  and
1983/1985/1986  (for 1980 and 1984), and  1988  (for 1985).
42Table  12
Outstanding  Loans  to Personal  Sector
(billion yen)
1965  1970  1975  1980  1985
Housing  Loans  740  4365  21850  44313  68532
GFIs  286  886  3476
PFIs  92  1858  12669
Employer  Loans  362  1621  5705
Consumer  Loans  563  1705  4083  15516  27395
Loans  103  584  1407  9161  16698
Finance  Co.  1  5  215  1705  1925
PFIs  50  520  1054  6818  12401
Pawn Shop  52  59  68
Post Office  70
Sales  Credit  460  1121  2676  6356  10697
GNP  32813  73046  151797  245163  325371
Housing+Consumer/GNP
4.0%  8.3%  17.1%  24.4%  29.5%
Housing+Consumer/TOTAL  loans  and discounts  (Table 6)
3.2%  6.7%  11.7%  15.5%  15.9%
Source:  Shohisha  Shlnyou  Toukel  (Consumer Credit Statistics),  1978 and
1988  and  Bank of Japan,  Economic  Statl8tical  Annual,  various
i88ues.
43Table  13
Composition  of Outstanding  Bank Loans
(Banking accounts,  trillion  yen)
Total  Large  Small  Individuals
Firms  Firms
All  loans
1975  88.0  53.4  29.3  5.2
60.7%  33.3%  5.9%
1980  134.6  66.1  55.7  12.8
49.1%  41.4%  9.5%
1985  222.8  103.6  103.1  16.0
46.5%  46.3%  7.2%
1990  376.0  111.5  214.7  49.8
29.6%  57.1%  13.3%
Equipment  loans
1975  23.7  12.6  6.3  4.8
53.1%  26.5%  20.3%
1980  36.7  13.0  11.6  12.1
35.4%  31.6%  33.0%
1985  53.5  17.1  21.1  15.3
32.0%  39.5%  28.6%
1990  130.8  24.8  67.9  38.2
18.9%  51.9%  29.2%
Note:  Small  firms  are  those with  capital  of  less  than 100
million  yen  (3D  million  yen  for  wholesale  and  10
million  yen  for  retail  trade)  in  1975.  Since  1977,
firms with fewer than 300 employees  (100 for wholesale
and retail trade)  are also classified  as  "small".
Source:  Bank  of  Japan,  Economic  Statstica  Annual,  various
issues.
44Table  14
Financial  Assets  and  Liabilities  of  Personal  Sector  (billion  yen)
1955/12  1960/12  1971/3  1981/3  1991/3
Total  assets  na  12741  70525  333598  954509
Cash  530  907  3982  13425  29205
Demand  deposits  1116  2169  8035  26728  54603
Time/savings  dep  1891  5163  32802  181577  414933
Trust  accounts  144  426  4062  21016  64942
Insurance  res  388  1282  9552  47108  199484
Securities  75D  2308  9982  40762  178149
Liabilities
PFI  loans  631  1902  15694  79599  221759
GPI  loans  214  591  2696  21151  51411
Trade  credit  593  1677  11185  31024  58374
Source:  Bank  of  Japan,  Economic  Statlatico  Annual,  various
issues.
45Table 15
Flow  of  Funds  of  Personal  Sector  (billion  yen)
Sources  of  Funds
Loans  (PF1)  (GFI)  Trade
Credit
1961/65  4139  3492  646  2319
1966/70  11521  9923  1598  6547
1971/75  31843  26792  5051  8990
1976/80  48647  35530  12118  10196
1981/85  46629  33222  13405  11470
1986/90  114005  96498  17507  20464
Uses of  Funds
Cash  Demand  Time  Secur  Trust  Insur
Save
1961/65  1000  2202  7586  2956  1103  1799
1966/70  2332  4474  19216  4203  2527  5695
1971/75  5162  11322  54646  10347  6310  12982
1976/80  4269  7297  94188  18779  10084  24575
1981/85  4680  7789  101154  30830  18691  45052
1986/90  11102  17790  132203  28417  24639  106963
Note:  Except  for  1961/65,  all  figures  are  for  fiscal  years.
Source:  Bank of  Japan,  Economlc  Statlotics  Annual,  various  issueo.
46Table  16
Equipment  Fund  Loans  from  GFI  and  LTC  Banks
(t  of  all  bank  loans)
1961  1971  1981  1991
GFI  LTC  GFI  LTC  GFI  LTC  GFI  LTC
Electric  Power  58  27  48  37  37  40  51  34
Ocean  Shipping  59  23  70  17  55  21  31  14
Coal  61  36  95  11  na  na  na  na
Iron  &  Steel  33  56  6  67  16  56  14  38
Textiles  2  56  9  54  9  43  4  10
Chemicals  11  56  13  55  17  50  20  26
Machinery  8  72  9  60  11  45.  8  15
Others  4  47  a  33  8  16  4  9
All  Industries  31  41  17  39  13  23  7  11
Notes:  GFI:  Government  Financial  Institutions
LTC:  Long-term  Credit  Banks
Source:  Japan  Development  Bank  (JDB/JERI  1994)
47Table  17
Composition  of New Supply of Industrial  Equipment  Fund by Industry
(billion yen and percentages)
Total  Stocks  Bonds  Loans  PFIs  GFIs  Special
Account
Manufacturing
1956/60  2532  530  113  1889  1607  279  4
21.0  4.5  74.6  63.5  11.0  0.2
1961/66  9322  1555  576  7191  6258  921  12
16.7  6.2  77.1  67.1  9.9  0.1
Mining
1954/60  199  32  3  163  109  47  7
16.1  1.5  81.9  54.8  23.6  3.5
1961/66  265  22  9  234  122  84  29
8.7  3.4  88.7  46.0  31.7  10.9
Agriculture,  Forestry  &  Fishery
1954/60  397  13  1  384  173  178  31
3.3  0.3  96.4  43.6  44.8  7.8
1961/66  890  21  7  862  427  421  13
2.4  0.8  96.8  48.0  47.3  1.5
Ulectric  Power
1954/60  1397  134  62  1201  773  167  261
9.6  4.4  86.0  55.3  12.0  18.7
1961/66  1539  192  300  1046  733  120  194
12.5  19.5  68.0  47.6  7.8  12.6
Land Transportation
1956/60  262  28  24  211  182  14  16
10.7  9.2  80.9  69.5  5.3  6.1
1961/66  1147  81  111  854  710  49  194
7.1  9.7  83.1  61.9  4.3  16.9
Marine  Transportation
1954/60  440  46  1  393  262  131  --
10.5  0.2  89.6  59.3  29.6  0.0
1961/66  561  13  --  548  237  282  28
2.3  0.0  97.7  42.3  50.3  5.0
Note:  Figures  for  1964  are  excluded  for  electric  power,  land  and
marine  transportation.
Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic  Statistics  Annual,  various  issues.
48Table  18
Composition  of New  Supply of Industrial  Equipment  Fund
by Major  Branch  of Manufacturing  Industry
(billion yen and percentages)
Total  Stocks  Bonds  Loans  PFIS  6FI8  Special
Account
Textile
1962/64  435  68  23  344  285  59  --
15.6  5.3  79.1  65.5  13.6  0.0
1965/67  489  7  34  447  365  82  --
1.4  7.0  91.4  74.6  16.8  0.0
Chemicals
1962/64  976  210  24  742  667  75  --
21.5  2.5  76.0  68.3  7.7  0.0
1965/67  1267  116  68  1083  1004  79  --
9.2  5.4  85.4  79.2  6.2  0.0
Machinery
1962/64  1149  257  63  829  727  102  --
22.4  5.5  72.1  63.3  8.9  0.0
1965/67  1280  62  166  1051  919  118  14
4.8  13.0  82.1  71.8  9.2  1.1
Iron  &  Steel
1962/64  732  220  47  466  441  25  --
30.1  6.4  63.9  60.2  3.4  0.0
1965/67  780  8  101  670  643  27  --
1.0  12.9  85.9  82.4  3.5  0.0
Source:  Bank of Japan, Economic  Statistics Annual,  1964  (pp. 35-36) and
1967  (pp. 53-54)
49Table  19
Composition  of  JDB  Lending
(%  of  total)
1961  1971  1981  1991
Electric  Power  50.3  21.6  28.8  38.3
ocean  Shipping  26.8  33.9  10.9  5.0
Coal  Mining  4.7  4.7
Iron  & St-el  9.5  2.3  4.7  1.6
Priority  IndustrLem  91.3  62.5  44.4  44.9
Teztll-.  0.3  1.5  0.8  0.4
Chemicals  2.6  5.9  4.6  3.3
XachLnery  1.7  4.4  2.6  3.2
Other  4.0  25.7  47.7  48.1
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  Japan  Development  Bank
s0Table  20
Allocation  of FILP Funds  ()
1953  1960  1970  19B0  1990
Industry
& Technology  29.1  13.6  5.7  3.0  2.9
Transport &
Comuimications  11.3  14.1  13.2  9.6  8.3
Trade & Econouic
Cooperation  --  7.9  10.6  5.6  5.8
Snall Business  7.9  12.7  15.4  18.7  15.7
Agriculture,  Fisheries
&  Forestry  11.2  7.1  5.0  4.9  3.1
Housing  5.2  12.9  19.3  26.2  30.3
All Other  35.3  31.8  30.8  32.0  33.9
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  JDB/JRfI 1994.
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